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This thesis explores the EU’s legal-institutional response to international terrorism since 
9/11. Through an analytical approach this work connects counterterrorism measures with 
outcomes in order to determine whether the European counterterrorism framework is 
successful in Europe today. The second chapter presents a historical overview of the 
EU’s counterterrorism response. Furthermore, this part details the main European 
counterterrorism-related institutions. The third chapter provides a qualitative analysis of 
several of the most influential as well as controversial European counterterrorism 
measures, with focus on solutions for the security-versus-human-rights dilemma and 
challenges in implementation. The forth chapter evaluates the European counterterrorism 
framework for effectiveness by measuring several indicators. This analysis demonstrates 
that the implementation of many counterterrorism measures corresponds to positive 
trends in terrorist activities, arrests, and convictions of terrorists. Also European 
counterterrorism initiatives may be linked to a lessening of European citizens’ fears of 
terrorism and to stable public support for European counterterrorism efforts, both positive 
developments. The fifth chapter gives an overview of European counterterrorism 
institution-related costs through period at issue. Ultimately, this thesis finds the European 
counterterrorism legal-institutional framework to accommodate human rights at the very 
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Despite a long experience with terrorism, homegrown and exogenous, Europe has 
only recently developed a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for 
counterterrorism (CT). What are the characteristics, challenges, and effects of the 
European Union’s counterterrorism legal and institutional measures introduced in the 
post-9/11 period? Does the EU fulfill its strategic commitment to “combat terrorism 
globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to 
live in an area of freedom, security and justice?” The most difficult challenge to the 
development of a counterterrorism framework is the dilemma of security versus human 
rights, yet in the European Union CT measures are as much as possible on the side of 
human rights while remaining effective.  
European cooperation in combating terrorism over the period from the late 1950s 
until the early 1990s resulted in several multinational legal measures for CT, but most of 
them were less than complete solutions without strong legal binding powers.1 The first 
truly supranational European CT legal measures were developed after 1992, with the 
ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), now commonly called the 
Maastricht Treaty.2 With “Anti-Terrorism Collaboration” now a part of the so-called 
third pillar of the treaty,3 terrorism became a joint EU security issue, rather than a 
domestic problem for the respective member states. There followed several European 
CT-related conventions, which seemed to herald a bright beginning for European CT 
                                                 
 
1 Paul Wilkinson, International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response, Chaillot 
Paper No. 84 (Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2005), 29, accessed May 10, 2012, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf. 
2 Europa: Summaries of EU legislation, “Building Europe through the treaties,” accessed May 10, 
2012, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm.  
3 The first pillar of the European Union, according to the Maastricht Treaty, is the so-called 
European Community pillar, with the most supranational attention from the premier European institutions, 
namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice.  The 
second pillar concerns itself with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), while the third 
pillar involves “justice and home affairs,” including criminal justice and terrorism, albeit on a more 




legislation.4  However, refinements to the European CT legal framework in that time 
were slow in coming, and the EU’s priority shifted to more pressing developments in the 
essential institutional/legal documents in the 1990s, specially focused on the full 
functioning of a European single market, which includes the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and persons.5  
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States moved the 
European CT legal framework well up the list of the EU’s priorities for action. 
Immediately after 9/11, the EU Council adopted several important instruments of the 
European CT legal framework, including: the Plan of Action in 2001 (impetus for the CT 
actions of the EU administration), the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in 
2002 (legal cornerstone of the European CT), and the Framework Decision on European 
Arrest Warrant in 2002 (replaced the complicated EU extradition procedures).6 Thus, in 
light of recent events, the willingness of EU member states to develop a proper European 
CT framework ran high. Something had to be done to protect Europe from the inevitable 
spread of anti-Western violence that the 9/11 attacks portended. At the same time, the 
European Commission7 used this opportunity to introduce some institutional measures 
related to combating homegrown terrorism that had been rejected before. The most 
important of those measures are establishment of the EU Agency for Judicial Cooperation 
                                                 
 
4 Peter Chalk, “The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-Terrorist 
Collaboration, and Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” in European Democracies against Terrorism: 
Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. Fernando Reinares (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000), 175. 
5 European Parliament, “The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties,” accessed May 31, 2012, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.3.pdf. 
6 Javier Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism, New York: Routledge, 2011, 19-21. 
7 “The three main decision-making institutions are: the European Parliament (EP), which 
represents the EU’s citizens and is directly elected by them; the Council of the European Union, which 
represents the individual member states; [and] the European Commission, which represents the interests of 
the Union as a whole. The powers and responsibilities of the EU institutions, and the rules and procedures 
they must follow, are laid down in the Treaties on which the EU is founded. The Treaties are agreed by the 
presidents and prime ministers of all the EU countries and then ratified by their parliaments. In general, it is 
the European Commission that proposes new legislation, but it is the Council and Parliament that pass the 
laws. In some cases, the Council can act alone.”; European Commission, “How the European Union works: 
Your guide to the EU institutions,” (Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, July 2007), accessed 




in Criminal Matters (Eurojust) and the EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), as well as 
institutionalization of CT-related cooperation with the Police Chief Operational Task 
Force (PCOTF).8 These new measures/institutions, along with the Europol’s expanded 
CT role, have been “influential in both shaping national responses and in producing a 
more harmonized approach throughout the EU.”9  
Later, the terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005) 
gave additional urgency to the introduction of new CT-related legal and institutional 
measures. The European Council adopted in 2004 the new and legally binding 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism. This document was an urgent call for the member 
states to put into practice the measures approved after 9/11, yet not implemented in 
national level. Along with the declaration and in order to improve coordination within the 
EU and member states in implementing CT measures, the first European 
Counterterrorism Coordinator was appointed.10 Soon after the terrorist attack in London 
the first EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted at the end of 2005.  
Since then, the strategy has been augmented with more than one hundred 
European CT legal and institutional measures. Many of these measures are not 
exclusively related to terrorism, but they indirectly support counterterrorism efforts. 
Moreover, they were developed in compliance with the EU’s strategic CT commitment to 
combat terrorism while respecting human rights and making EU safer, as well as 
                                                 
 
8 Frank Gregory, “The EU's Response to 9/11: A Case Study of Institutional Roles and Policy 
Processes with Special Reference to Issues of Accountability and Human Rights,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 17 (2005), 105-123, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546550590520618.  
9 CEPOL, “Counter Terrorism,” accessed May 26, 2012, 
http://www.cepol.europa.eu/index.php?id=counter-terrorism.  
10 Council of the European Union, Declaration on Combating Terrorism (Brussels, Belgium: 





following the four main European CT Strategy pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and 
respond.11  
Thus, the quantity of the European CT legal and institutional measures is clear, 
but what about the quality of all this legislation and institutions? Is Europe safer from 
terrorism today? Some experts argue that the European CT framework is, at best, an 
administrative achievement without operational effects.12 Other observers take a more 
positive view and argue that the CT framework has had a real and positive impact on the 
EU member states’ counterterrorism efforts, quantifiable as a decrease in terrorist 
activities.13     
This thesis begins with this latter viewpoint—that the European’s CT efforts have 
been substantive and meaningful. The study explores the development and outcomes of 
the post-9/11 EU counterterrorism-related legal-institutional framework, with an eye 
toward its human rights sensitivity, effectiveness, and—briefly—overall costs. 
                                                 
 
11 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Brussels, 
Belgium: Council of the European Union, December 1, 2005), accessed April 2, 2012,  
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf; The European CT strategy is 
developed through four main pillars: prevent (targeting root causes of terrorism, cross-cultural dialogue, 
media-related strategy, counter recruitment measures, combating radicalization), protect (transport security 
standards, critical infrastructure protection, border control), pursue (funding reduce measures, police and 
judicial EU and international cooperation and technical assistance), and respond (consequence 
management, civil protection, risk assessment tools, lessons  learned sharing).  
12 Oldrich Bures, EU Counterterrorism Policy, A Paper Tiger? (Furnham, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2001); Raphael Bossong, "The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism: A Flawed 
Instrument of EU Security Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies  46, no. 1 (2008): 27-48, 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=168b8165-0cda-4d42-93e5-
417a7af5a770%40sessionmgr10&vid=2&hid=21.  
13 Christian Kaunert, European Internal Security: Towards supranational governance in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010); Dorine Dubois, 
“The Attack of 11 September: EU-US Cooperation Against Terrorism in the Field of Justice and Home 
Affairs,” European Foreign Affairs Review 7, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 317-335; Nicola Vennemann, ”Country 
Report on the European Union,” in Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security 
versus Liberty?, ed. Christian Walker et al. (Heidelrberg, Germany: Springer, 2004), 265; J ӧrg Monar, 
“Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its 
Problems,” Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 293, accessed May 10, 2012, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00225.x/pdf; Davide Casale, “EU 
Institutional and Legal Counter-terrorism Framework,” Defense Against Terrorism Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 






A. THESIS CONSPECTUS 
Following this introduction, Chapter II reviews chronologically the response of 
the EU through introduction of the CT legal-institutional measures in different periods: 
the post-9/11 initial stage, the post-Madrid attack stage, and the post-London attack stage. 
Each terrorist attack triggered a boost of EU activity related to the introduction and 
implementation of CT legal-institutional measures. Furthermore, this chapter gives a 
detailed overview of the main European CT-related institutions. 
Chapter III provides qualitative analysis of several of the most influential as well 
as controversial European CT legal-institutional measures: the European Arrest Warrant, 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Directives, EU targeted sanctions against 
individuals or groups, and counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. The 
chapter analyzes the characteristics and applied solutions for a security-versus-human-
rights dilemma, as well as challenges in implementation. The results show that the EU, in 
part through the very legal and institutional mechanisms that so frustrate some CT 
partners (like the United States), does, in fact manage to uphold its commitment human 
rights, while implementing CT measures. 
Chapter IV evaluates the European CT legal-institutional framework from the 
effectiveness perspective by measuring several indicators. First, the chapter examines 
trends of terrorist activities in the EU (2006–2011) through the data on failed, foiled, and 
successful terrorist attacks and data of victims. Second, the chapter analyzes for the same 
time period the data on arrested terrorists and the data on terrorism-related prosecutions 
and convictions. Finally, the chapter examines the EU public terrorist threat perception 
according to opinion poll trends since 2001. This chapter demonstrates that the 
implementation of many CT measures in last six years corresponds to a decreasing trend 
in terrorist activities, as well as fits increasing and then decreasing trends of arrests and 
convictions of terrorists. Furthermore, European CT initiatives may be linked to a 
lessening of European citizens’ fears of terrorism and to stable public support for 




Chapter V gives an overview of European CT institution-related costs through 
period after 9/11 as well as providing a comparison of the costs associated with the 
introduction of the European CT instruments, some trends in terrorist activities and 
achievements of the European CT institutions. Ultimately, this thesis finds the European 
CT legal-institutional framework to accommodate human rights at the very high level that 
European citizens expect, while successfully managing effective CT measures. 
B. WHY AND HOW THE EUROPEAN COUNTERTERRORISM LEGAL-
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK MATTERS 
Although European terrorism has long formed a very important international 
security issue, it was normally considered to be a national or, at most, a regional problem 
and typically failed to garner long-term focus by policymakers. Among the European 
countries, the United Kingdom and Spain have suffered the most domestic separatist 
terrorism; indeed, it is only in the context of the most recent circumstances that the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Euzadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) have declared an 
end to their violence as a means of effecting political change. Other European terrorism-
related issues in the past include left-wing (revolutionary) terrorist groups like the Brigate 
Rosse in Italy, the Baader-Meinhof gang (later Red Army Faction—RAF) in West 
Germany, 17 November in Greece, and Action Directe in France. All operated since 
1970s, but had vanished after the collapse of the Soviet Union because they were pretty 
much wholly funded by or through Moscow. (The groups tended to direct their actions 
domestically, despite their connections across the Iron Curtain.)  Right-wing14 terrorism 
has been issue for European centuries, with peaks in the period after WWII and during 
the 1980s and early 1990s; far-right extremists were especially active in Italy, the UK, 
France, Germany, and Sweden. Over the last three decades, many right-wing terrorist 
groups petered out, while others changed their strategy and transformed into right-
oriented political parties, but right-wing terrorism has never entirely disappeared in 
Europe, as Anders Breivik’s 2011 rampage in Norway or the so-called “Nazi murders” in 
                                                 
 
14 Right-wing terrorism (extremism) is inspired by several different ideologies, including neo-




Germany attest. Right-wing terrorism is more or less necessarily nationalistic and, thus, 
domestically fixated, though the Breivik case raised fears that the far right might be 
networking for methods and means. 
Oslo police Chief Wilberg discovered this first-hand, when he described 
“searching for a needle among 8,000 other needles” in his attempts to retrospectively 
identify presumed members of Anders Breivik’s elusive Knights Templar. While the 
perpetrator’s utterances surrounding this group have been deemed fictional – little more 
than mere fantasies dreamt up during hours of roleplaying online – his tortuous accounts, 
as he [Breivik] affirmed himself, may well have reflected “pompous” exaggeration rather 
than outright myth. Certainly, the confused organizational structures and interactions he 
described during his trial somewhat mirrored what we already knew about the complex 
behaviors of online extremist networks.15 
Then in the 1990s, Islamic terrorism came to Europe for the first time in a 
campaign of violence against the French government and its political support for the 
autocratic regimes in North Africa.16 After the attacks of 9/11 and the rising prominence 
of the worldwide Islamist threat, terrorism became the most important global security 
challenge. EU law and institutions changed to meet this challenge, introducing measures 
tailored to combat international as well as homegrown terrorism. 
The examination of the evolution, the characteristics, the challenges, and 
especially the effectiveness of the European CT legal-institutional framework 
demonstrates the novel and significant contribution to European and global CT efforts. 
The EU agencies, in particular Europol and Eurojust have developed close, daily CT 
cooperation with the EU member states and with external partners, especially the United 
States; “cooperation” here entails sharing information, threat analyses, early warnings, 
and joint investigation teams. The unique European Arrest Warrant tremendously 
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decreased the time required for the extradition of terrorism suspects. Legal instruments to 
combat the finance of terrorism have had many positive effects, identifying and freezing 
ever more terrorist assets. Infrastructure-protection measures have brought in the private 
sector as a valuable CT partner as well as introducing standards in port security (airports, 
bus/train stations, and seaports) has become a new standard.  
Furthermore, the importance of the present effort lies in its analysis of solutions 
for overcoming certain limitations of CT-related international law by using the European 
CT legal framework as an example. In the absence of international legal consensus 
regarding the definition of terrorism, there is an opportunity to use to good effect the new 
and comprehensive definition introduced by the EU, which accords with the UN 
terrorism-related conventions. Generally speaking, an effective and efficient European 
CT legal-institutional regime can be used in other treaty-based regional organizations that 
seek an effective CT framework solution, like the African Union, the League of Arab 
States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, or the Organization of American 
States.  
C. EU COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE EYES OF SCHOLARS 
The crucial message is that turning EU counterterrorism policy into a real tiger 
requires a careful assessment of both the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
the available legal instruments and institutional structures at all levels. There are several 
areas where EU approaches make perfect sense due to the transnational nature of the 
contemporary terrorist threat and the nature of a “borderless” Europe where people, 
goods, capital and services ought to move freely.17  
The foremost controversy among scholars of EU counterterrorism concerns the 
question of whether the European CT legal-institutional framework amounts to anything. 
While noting some moments of progress, Oldrich Bures ultimately concludes that the 
                                                 
 




European CT framework is just a “paper tiger.”18 However, Bures takes a selective view 
of the available evidence and, thus, arrives at overstated conclusions. He provides an 
effectiveness analysis based on a few salient measurement indicators (terrorist threats, 
public perception, and implementation deficit impact) without taking into consideration 
the broader picture and strong direct indicators (terrorist activities, arrests and 
prosecutions of terrorists, interagency CT cooperation, and costs of CT measures). 
Furthermore, Bures’s effectiveness analysis does not account for the fulfillment of the 
strategic commitment in the European CT Strategy, which is the baseline of the 
framework; for example, many reports show that the CT framework has contributed 
greatly to better integration and cooperation in European and international CT efforts, as 
well as in straightening national CT capabilities and more human rights sensitiveness in 
terrorism related activities. 
Since the comprehensive development of the European CT legal-institutional 
framework started after 9/11, there has been a flurry of analyses, but most focus on one 
particular CT measure or institution, rather than the overall approach. While many CT 
experts have analyzed the same European CT measures, they use different methods or 
indicators, so their final results are different—and incompatible.  
The European CT legal-institutional measures adopted after 2005, curiously, have 
received little attention. Such scholars as Beckman, Bures, Argomaniz, or Kaunert have 
turned their attention to the topic, but they are selective in their works and analyze just a 
part of measures, especially “direct” CT legal measures (related only to terrorism), 
without accounting for the full range of factors.19  Beyond the variety of official 
European CT documents related to the broad set of the European CT legal measures, only 
O’Neill examines the matter through a very comprehensive secondary study and gives an 
overview of evolution and characteristics. He argues  “that the EU’s counter-terrorism 
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provisions are still under construction” and many CT measures are scattered around 
several areas hardly visible as the European CT related measures—perhaps in part 
because so little other scholarship has clarified these issues.20 
Analysis of the effectiveness of the European CT legal-institutional measures 
remains the aspect of this thesis with the slimmest backing in the literature. Argomaniz 
argues that “EU counter-terrorism currently suffers from serious consistency weaknesses 
and some of these shortcomings have their roots in the political processes that shaped the 
proceeding stage of institutionalization of the policy domain.”21 Furthermore, he 
concludes that is very hard to research effectiveness of the European CT measures 
without an understanding of EU institutions and complexity of relations between the EU 
and its member states. Um and Pisoiu argue that main problem of measuring CT 
effectiveness is researchers’ overemphasis on an “impact” component of effectiveness 
(trends of terrorist attacks or specific methods) rather than an “output” component 
(implementation of CT measures, increasing capabilities) and an “outcome” component 
(direct effect of measures on life).22  
Although several European countries publish annual reports on terrorist activities, 
this thesis uses Europol reports as the only comprehensive reports with standardized data 
and typology. According to the EUROPOL annual reports (TE-SAT 2006–2011), 
terrorist activities in the EU after 2005, when the European CT Strategy was adopted, 
have declined steadily and rapidly. Other reports document negative trends in failed, 
foiled, or completed attacks, increasing numbers of arrests, and increasing numbers of 
prosecutions for terrorism charges.23 Even these detailed and accurate Europol reports 
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should be taken with a certain caution because some of positive outcomes are not known 
in public. De Goede concludes “due to the secrecy in issues relating to countering 
terrorism, even if a means to measure effectiveness did exist, its results would not be 
public.”24  
Regarding the implementation of the European CT legal-institutional measures 
EU and member-state produces reports according to the EU Council “[d]ecision 
establishing a mechanism for evaluating the legal systems and their implementation at 
national level in the fight against terrorism.”25 Brown concludes that the effects were 
broad and very positive after the implementation of legal measures that especially 
facilitated multinational cooperation among the EU member states in the judiciary, 
police, and anti-money laundering.26 Furthermore, this thesis explores many post-9/11 
reports and studies of European CT Coordinator, Europol, and Eurojust. 
The terrorist threat perception in the EU (including all member states), as a part of 
the overall security threat rarely has been analyzed; Bakker, Meyer, Murshed, and 
Bures.27 The authors conclude that terrorist threat perception among EU member states 
varies over time and according to the incidence of terrorist attacks. This thesis uses 
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Eurobarometer28 as the only detailed and official source for measuring of the EU public 
opinion (all of the above authors use the same source).   
Ultimately, regarding the overall European CT effort, Monar concludes: “There is 
no other example in the world of a group of countries agreeing on a comprehensive 
common (counterterrorism) strategy and action plan similar to that of the EU … this must 
be regarded as a major achievement in itself.”29 In support of Monar’s opinion this thesis 
is an attempt to find comprehensive arguments and evidence for acknowledgement of the 
European CT efforts.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The European CT legal-institutional framework serves as a case study of 
evolution, scope of action, challenges, and effectiveness. To a significant extent, this 
thesis relies on qualitative and quantitative analysis of the primary sources of the 
European Union including: directives, declarations, framework decisions, common 
positions, communication papers, plans of actions, reports, meeting minutes, public 
opinion polls, terrorist activities annual reports, and other contributing documents. 
Furthermore, the examination of the European CT legal-institutional framework will be 
supported with qualitative analyses of the available secondary sources like books, journal 
articles, and think-tank research papers. 
Chapter II is a historical overview with focus on identifying the factors that led to 
development of broad set of CT measures. In this case, the examination will focus on the 
three different periods that were dominated in evolution, post-9/11 initial stage, post-
Madrid attack stage, and post-London attack stage. Chapter III is a qualitative review of 
the major characteristics, challenges and solutions concerning the European CT legal-
institutional framework including CT governance issues, human rights sensitiveness, and 
legislation harmonization issue. Chapter IV is triangulating different methods including 
                                                 
 
28 European Commission, “Public Opinion,” accessed May 24, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.  




comparative study, statistical analysis, and qualitative analysis. Several data collections 
in quantitative research methods will be used extensively to analyzing indicators of the 
European CT legal-institutional framework effectiveness (terrorist activities, threat 
perception pools). Chapter V is a statistical analysis of the EU bodies’ CT expenditures 
since 9/11.  
This analytical approach connects measures with outcomes in order to decide 
whether the European CT framework is successful or not. Governments and CT agencies 
usually justify their measures in terms of incidents of terrorist activities versus funds 
committed to CT measures to arrive at a basic measure of cost-effectiveness. On the other 
hand, many experts suggest that this rational approach with direct indicators is 
insufficient and other indicators should be taken into account, as well. Such indicators 
include legality of measures, public fear of terrorism, the adequacy and efficiency of the 
terrorist attack response, the number of victims in terrorist attacks, international CT 
cooperation, the sharing of information, and the impact of CT measures on terrorist 
recruitment.   These factors provide a much fuller picture of the effect and effectiveness 
of CT measures and this thesis provides analyses of all of them except impact on terrorist 
recruitment. Although an impact on terrorist recruitment represents a very important 
indicator, the proposed project will not undertake to examine it, owing to the absence of 
sources (no existing official reports or literature). 
The existing literature is mixed in its conclusions about the quality of the efforts 
and the effectiveness of the European CT approach. This thesis responds to the 
differences in those findings through an acknowledgement of the unique EU approach to 
the issue. Distinct from—but not incompatible with—the United States as a global leader 
in the fight against terrorism, the EU and European countries view combating terrorism 
primarily as a mission of law enforcement and intelligence institutions, while 
emphasizing the protection of the fundamental human rights of all involved, including 
even the terrorists. Europe’s own struggle to secure human rights to the degree and extent 
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II. EVOLUTION AND KEY INSTITUTIONS OF THE POST-9/11 
EU COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSE 
Although many European countries gained a lot of counterterrorism experience 
with homegrown terrorism throughout the 20th century, the development of a European 
legal framework for CT as well as CT-related institutions only happened with the 
establishment of the European Union. Thus, even the Convention on Extradition (1957), 
which facilitated the early stage of European judicial cooperation, was ineffective in 
counterterrorism because one of the articles allowed a state to refuse an extradition in 
case the request related to a political offence—at a time when European terrorism was 
thought of almost exclusively as politically oriented.30  
The informal cooperation was much more promising. In the 1970s, amid the 
uptick in domestic terrorism and the rising threat of Palestinian extremism, European 
countries formed several different working groups and initiatives in order to improve 
their counterterrorism efforts.31 Of particular interest is the Terrorism, Radicalism, 
Extremism, and Political Violence Group (TREVI), established in 1975 by European 
Community member states. In 1977, the same states introduced TREVI I as special 
counterterrorism subgroup. 32 Although TREVI did not have official European 
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Community competencies, permanent structures, legal powers, or even a budget, until the 
1990s, it marked the only European CT success, however limited, especially in 
information sharing and cross-border assistance in organized crime and terrorism.33  
Initially little more than a drinking club, it [TREVI] developed from its 
humble social origins into a body where experience and good practice 
could be exchanged between police forces.34 
The TREVI group persisted until 1993, when the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU, Maastricht Treaty) was ratified and became operational. Title VI of the third 
Maastricht Treaty pillar, “Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA),” advances the 
most fundamental EU idea, freedom of movement, which requires a secure area where 
people can travel safely within the Union and enjoy the same protections of life, liberty, 
and property that they know at home. To this end, the JHA followed lead of the TREVI 
group and addressed issues such as asylum policy, external borders and border control, 
immigration, drug addiction, international fraud, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters, customs cooperation, and police cooperation.35 The Maastricht Treaty also called 
for the establishment of the European Police Office (Europol), but amid the complicated 
and changing framework of EU institutions, Europol did not take up operations until 
1998.36 Slowly but surely, the counterterrorism legislation began to appear, as well, 
including such measures as the EU Declaration on the Financing of Terrorism in 1993; 
the La Gomera Summit Declaration in 1995, which recognized terrorism as a “priority 
objective among the matters of common interest”; the EU Convention on Extradition in 
1996, which abolished political exemptions in case of extradition; and the European 
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Judicial Network (EJN), introduced in 1998, which speeded up judicial processes among 
member states.37   
Then came the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which introduced the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), with which the EU promised “to maintain and 
develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free 
movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of 
crime.”38  The Treaty of Amsterdam made changes in JHA pillar by moving areas of 
asylum, immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters to the first pillar (European 
Community), and then consolidating the remaining functions into a new, more 
streamlined pillar, now called Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCC).39 After the Treaty of Amsterdam, the third pillar acquired many of the basic 
provisions that would become important for counterterrorism, including operational 
police cooperation (prevention, investigation, data exchange, joint training, liaison 
officers), Europol (support for national investigations, EU police coordination, assisting 
in arrangements between prosecuting/investigating officials), judicial cooperation 
(proceedings, facilitation of extradition, compatibility of rules, prevention of conflicts of 
jurisdiction), harmonization of national criminal laws including the provisions of 
terrorism, opportunity for agreements with third countries or international organizations 
regarding third pillar issues,  unification of standards in carrying out checks on persons at 
external EU borders, and unified rules on visas for period less than three months.  
Still, PJCC posted only limited operational progress, especially in the field of 
counterterrorism. More broadly, in the period 1993–2000, EU conventions on issues of 
terrorism did not lead to the introduction of strong CT legal-institutional measures 
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because member states still did not consider CT as an EU issue. They also resisted the 
demands for increased integration at the expense of sovereignty, especially in sensitive 
area as security. As Argomatiz concludes, “terrorism almost always remained at the 
bottom of initiatives [and furthermore] in two of these eight years—1997 and 2000—
there was not a single legislative instrument, binding or non-binding.”40 The EU 
Commission had to contend with insufficient experts in the JHA Directorate and Europol 
was effectively limited to activities in collection, transmission, and analysis of data 
provided by national law-enforcement. (Before 9/11, only seven officers were seconded 
to the CT section).41 The notable—if partial—exception to this record of inactivity on CT 
came in 1999, when the EU Council met in Tampere, Finland, and agreed on the so-
called Tampere milestones, related to freedom, justice, and security.42 
Ultimately, in spite of fact that terrorist activities in Europe had touched directly 
or indirectly all European countries until 2001, joint European CT approach was mostly 
declarative, without willingness to accept terrorism as a European security problem (not 
only domestic) and to share security-related part of sovereignty, let alone to support new 
CT structural initiatives or any kind of terrorism-related intelligence sharing. Still, the 
basic elements took shape in this period for a unified or at least coordinated CT response. 
A. 9/11 AND THE FIRST EU COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSES 
The terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, provided both a 
call to action and an opportunity for action in the realm of EU counterterrorism.43 It is 
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important to note that by that date, only six EU member states had CT legislation and 
operational CT instruments; cross-border CT support was negligible.44  However, shortly 
after 9/11, Germany and Spain were identified as bases for the planning and execution of 
the attacks, and European officials, in cooperation with the United States, undertook 
many CT operations (79 actions by October 19, 2001) that led to numerous arrests in 
several EU member states—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK.45  
The European Council held its first 9/11-related session just ten days after the 
attacks, on September 21, 2001, in order to discuss the international situation and urgent 
EU responses. Through its final conclusions, the Council expressed its solidarity with the 
United States, its willingness to cooperate more and more intensively, and its 
determination to play greater role in finding solutions in conflicts around the world 
(especially Middle East) as prevention of terrorism. Most importantly, the Council 
approved the first Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism.46 The Plan of Action or “CT 
Roadmap” was inspired by the 1999 Tampere Summit conclusions and provided 
guidelines for the European CT response. It introduced 41 measures/actions in five main 
CT areas: (1) enhancing police and judicial cooperation (development of the European 
Arrest Warrant and a common EU definition of terrorism, identification of terrorists and 
its organizations in the EU, enhance Europol role in data sharing and special investigation 
teams); (2) developing international legal instruments (implementation as quickly as 
possible all terrorism-related international conventions); (3) putting an end to the funding 
of terrorism (extension of the Council Directive on money laundering and the framework 
Decision on freezing assets); (4) strengthening air security (threat assessment, training for 
crews, improve checking of luggage, cockpit protection, quality control of all measures 
applied by the EU member States); and (5) coordinating the European Union’s global CT 
                                                 
 
44 Counterterrorism legislation in 2001 have Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom; Grajny “The European Union Counterterrorism Policy.” 
45 Grajny “The European Union Counterterrorism Policy.” 
46 Council of the European Union, “Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary 
European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 





action.47 On October 19, 2001 the European Council adopted a declaration that mainly 
repeats European CT position and strongly encouraged the urgent implementation of the 
measures listed in the roadmap.48   
Although by the end of 2001, the EU Commission and the EU member states 
agreed on a common definition of terrorism as the main element of CT legislation and on 
the EU list of terrorists and terrorist organizations, six more months of negotiations 
ensued before the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism was adopted.49  The 
Framework Decision forms the legal cornerstone of the European CT efforts and, as a 
part of EU law, is binding for all member states and EU bodies.50  
The framework decision harmonizes the definition of terrorist offences in 
all EU countries by introducing a specific and common definition. Its 
concept of terrorism is a combination of two elements:51 
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• An objective element, as it refers to a list of instances of serious 
criminal conduct (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, 
extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks, threatening 
to commit any of the above, etc.); 
• A subjective element, as these acts are deemed to be terrorist 
offences when committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a 
population, unduly compelling a government or international 
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organization. 
 
The Framework Decision provides also important CT guidelines in areas of 
terrorism support penalties, policing, jurisdiction and prosecution, protection of victims, 
implementation regulations, and reporting system.52 On the same day as the CT 
framework, the European Arrest Warrant, another binding document for member states, 
was introduced to replace the complicated extradition procedures between EU member 
states with a streamlined and unified process.53  
Since the European CT Action Plan was adopted on September 21, 2001, it was 
updated several times in October 2001, July 2002, and November 2002 as regards the 
implementation and introduction of new measures. In all, some64 measures/actions were 
added by the end of 2002. Then the momentum seems to have given out. No updates 
were published in 2003.54 More broadly, while many CT activities from the previous 
versions of the Action Plan were ongoing, motivation for further refinements of the 
European CT efforts in 2003 was declining. The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq divided 
member states, particularly over Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction 
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(WMD). In order to overcome these differences, the EU needed to renegotiate its 
common security and defense positions with all member states, updating and 
consolidating the European Security and Defense Policy (1999).55  
A solution was found through the development of the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), adopted in December 2003. The ESS marked a major step forward in framing a 
common approach to security, and it identifies three strategic objectives: (1) address the 
threats (terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized 
crime); (2) build security in EU neighborhood; and (3) help to establish an international 
order based on effective multilateralism.56 The ESS is “the first ever strategic document 
providing long-term guidance for the whole of EU foreign policy,”57 and provides 
opportunity for further development of different security issue-related sub-strategies—
including a Counterterrorism Strategy—in order to define specific objectives, priorities, 
resources, and conditions (norms) for execution.  
The Strategy calls for the EU to be “more active” in pursuing its strategic 
objectives, through a holistic approach utilizing “the full spectrum of 
instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including 
political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development 
activities.” ‘Spreading good governance, sup-porting social and political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule 
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of law and protecting human rights’ should produce ‘a world of well-
governed democratic states.’58 
 The promising, if high-flown, rhetoric proved hard to follow with action, even in 
the post-9/11 situation, not least because the members of the EU lapsed back into 
politics-as-usual in the relative quite that ensued after the first burst of activity. For 
example, the European Arrest Warrant and the Money Laundering Directives adopted in 
2001 were not implemented for another four years.59 In other words, the bracing effects 
of the 9/11 attacks on the distant shores of a controversial ally had only so much staying 
power. Europe’s CT framework would have to wait for the next calamity before it took 
on more substance. 
B. MADRID TERRORIST ATTACK AS AN ACCELERATOR 
During the Madrid morning rush hour on March 11, 2004, ten bombs exploded in 
four commuter trains. The blasts killed 191 people, injured 1.841, and caused €17.62 
million in immediate material damages—plus another €211.58 million in estimated 
related economic cost for Spain.60 The bombings were reported to be retaliation, authored 
by a Spanish group sympathetic to or affiliated with al Qaeda, for Spain’s participation in 
the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, yet later investigation did not find evidence to decide 
exactly who masterminded the attacks.61  
This horrible event pushed the EU counterterrorism issue again into the 
limelight—and moved it to the forefront of EU planning. Shortly after the Madrid 
bombings, the European Commission issued the Action Paper in Response to the 
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Terrorist Attacks on Madrid (March 18), which proposed to the Council several urgent 
responses from the EU: the EU Declaration of solidarity with Spain; better and faster 
national implementation of earlier adopted European CT legislative instruments; adoption 
of draft CT measures that waiting on the EU Council table; strengthening the fight 
against terrorist financing, enhanced operational coordination and cooperation, enhanced 
dialogue with third countries on terrorism, and such other measures as support for victims 
of terrorism, health security measures related to bio-terrorism, community civil-
protection mechanisms, etc.62  
The European Council reacted quickly adopted the Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism on meeting March 24–26, 2004, which introduced all the proposed actions 
from the EU Commission memo, a and, in addition, requested urgent work on a plan for 
implementing the ESS; established the EU counterterrorist coordinator to facilitate the 
CT work of the EU Council; and mandated the preparation of a revised Plan of Action to 
Combat Terrorism through seven main objectives:63  
• [Objective 1] To deepen the international consensus and enhance 
international efforts to combat terrorism [17 measures/actions];  
• [Objective 2] To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and 
economic resources [16 measures/actions];   
• [Objective 3] To maximize the capacity within EU bodies and 
member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to 
prevent terrorist attacks [59 measures/actions];  
• [Objective 4] To protect the security of international transport and 
ensure effective systems of border control [19 measures/actions];  
• [Objective 5] To enhance the capability of the European Union and 
of member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist 
attack [15 measures/actions];  
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• [Objective 6] To address the factors which contribute to support 
for, and recruitment into, terrorism [12 measures/actions];  
• [Objective 7] To target actions under EU external relations towards 
priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or 
commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced [16 
measures/actions].64  
Furthermore, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism included the EU 
declaration on solidarity against terrorism, “in which Member States agreed to act jointly 
and mobilize all available means, including military resources, if one of them is victim of 
a terrorist attack.” Thus, following the seven objectives from the Declaration, the CT Plan 
of Action was updated immediately (during the March meeting) with more detailed 
measures and more precise deadlines for implementation. In all, it includes a total of 155 
measures and actions.65 
Just two months later, on June 18, 2004, the EU Council approved the next 
revision of the European CT Action Plan, but it also made the important decision that the 
Action Plan should be revised and approved by the Council twice a year. Moreover, the 
plan should consist of an “updated matrix, containing all the actions of the Action Plan 
and an annex showing an overview of the implementation by Member States of EU-
legislation in the fight against terrorism as well as ratification of the relevant UN-
Conventions.”66  
In the wake the Council meeting and the proposals for the latest revision of the 
European CT Action Plan, the EU Commission on October 20, 2004, sent to the Council 
and the European Parliament four important initiatives with aim to make counterterrorism 
“an integral part of general EU policy”: (1) prevention, preparedness and response to 
terrorist attacks; (2) prevention of and the fight against terrorist financing; (3) 
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preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism; and (4) critical 
infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism.67 These initiatives developed 
important ideas for civil society’s involvement in the fight against terrorism through: 
defending fundamental rights against violent radicalization; public-private security 
dialogue; support to victims of terrorism; integrated community CT policies; integrated 
EU and national rapid alert and civil protection systems; better communications with 
public; scientific and technical research in the area of security; and effective and 
integrated cooperation with the private sector.68  
Also during the meeting on November 4–5 2004, the EU Council adopted “The 
Hague Program: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union,” 
which among many measures, requested integrated CT actions between member states 
and third states in connection with terrorist recruitment, terrorist financing, threat 
analysis, infrastructure protection, and consequence management.69 And on November 
22, 2004, the Council adopted the Conceptual Framework on the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, which initiates use of 
an overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention ESDP capabilities in support of the 
European CT objectives listed in the March 2004 Council’s Declaration.70 According to 
the EU Council decision from June 2004 on regular reporting about the European CT 
Action Plan measures and activities and implementation, in December 2004 was 
presented updated version of the plan.71 The updated Action Plan identifies several 
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achievements: total number of listed CT measures/actions increased to 164; better CT 
cooperation with non-member states (especially with U.S. and neighbors); ratification 
and implementation of the CT-related UN conventions by most of the EU member states; 
improvements in the fight against terrorism financing; limited progress in implementation 
of the earlier adopted European CT legislative instruments; better CT-related information 
sharing; and improving the CT contribution from Europol, Eurojust, and Police Chiefs 
Task Force.72 According to the schedule, the last update of the European CT Action Plan 
in the post-Madrid stage was adopted by the Council on May 24, 2005. The main 
objectives remain unchanged, but the number of CT measures and actions increased to 
203.73    
The post-Madrid period represents a more joint European approach in CT than 
ever before, and two important adopted instruments contributed to the ultimate 
development of the CT framework: the EU Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism 
and new European CT Coordinator position in the EU Council Secretariat. Ultimately, at 
the end of the post-Madrid period, the EU adopted many new CT measures, activities and 
legal documents. Still, the lack of a strategic European CT strategy that serves as binding 
document for member states, as well as very slow member state’s implementation 
process, continued to degrade the overall outcomes of the European CT efforts.  
C. LONDON TERRORIST ATTACK AS A FINAL TRIGGER  
On July 7, 2005 the first suicide terrorist bombing in Western Europe took 
place on the London Public Transport System. Three bombs at three 
separate locations on the London Underground, and one bomb on a 
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London Bus, were detonated by hand.74 Fifty-two civilians and four 
bombers were killed and more than 700 [people] were injured.75 
The London attacks again proved the theory that the European CT response has 
been driven by events, notably terrorist attacks. And like after 9/11 and Madrid, the 
political momentum to agree on difficult CT issues picked up quickly after London 
attacks, which was obvious through the more efficient and faster implementation of CT 
measures. The EU reaction was fast; an extraordinary EU Council Meeting was held on 
July 13, 2005, and the Council adopted a Declaration condemning the London attacks 
and promising to “accelerate implementation of the EU Action Plan on Combating 
Terrorism and other existing commitments.”76 The Declaration highlights the importance 
of improving capabilities in pursuing and investigating terrorists across borders, 
preventing people turning to terrorism, protecting citizens and infrastructure, and 
improving ability to manage and minimize the consequences of terrorist attacks. Also, the 
Council requested the rapid introduction and implementation of several already prepared 
important European CT-related legal instruments,77 and announced review of all 
activities in “December 2005, including on national implementation of EU measures in 
order to ensure that the Union has the right framework for combating terrorism.”78  
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More than four years after 9/11 and around two hundred CT measures and 
activities the EU was still missing a long-term CT policy that could be understood easily 
by EU citizens and used as strategic guidelines for member states’ governments. 
Therefore, the UK, during its six-month rotation in the presidency of the EU, joined 
forces with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to develop the first draft of the 
European CT Strategy. The strategy was presented on October 21, 2005, to the Council 
of Permanent Representatives to the European Council (COREPER).79 The draft explains 
the European CT as a strategic commitment for the long term. It positions itself as a 
reinforcement of national CT efforts and introduces mechanisms for political oversight of 
the strategy and for monitoring progress at the operational level. Tellingly, while many 
previous important EU legal-institutional CT instruments were adopted only after delays 
and long and hard negotiations between the EU Commission and the member states, the 
draft of European Union Counter-Terrorist Strategy was negotiated very quickly and the 
strategy was adopted after only 40 days on November 30, 2012.80  
Through the CT Strategy, “the commitment of the Union is to combat terrorism 
globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to 
live in an area of freedom, security and justice.”81 The strategy organizes previously 
adopted CT-related measures and actions under four pillars—prevent, protect, pursue, 
and response—as well as summarizing all previous CT legal, institutional, and 
operational documents of the EU.  
The strategy emphasizes a need to: (1) prevent “people [from] turning to 
terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to 
radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally,” (2) protect 
“citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, 
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including through improved security of borders, transport and critical 
infrastructure,” (3) pursue and investigate “terrorists across our borders 
and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt 
support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and 
bring terrorists to justice,” (4) “prepare ourselves, in the spirit of 
solidarity, to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack, 
by improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath; the co-ordination of 
the response; and the needs of victims.”82  
At the end of 2004 the EU Council agreed to develop counter-radicalization and 
recruitment in the terrorism strategy and related action plan—which after the London 
attacks became the European CT Strategy—but also simultaneously adopted the 
European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism on 
November 24, 2005.83 In the strategy, the EU promises to: “disrupt the activities of the 
networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism; ensure that voices of 
mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; promote yet more vigorously 
security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all.”84  
Since the end of 2005, dozens of new legal and institutional instruments has been 
introduced. The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (CTC) has reported to the Council 
twice a year on the implementation of the CT Strategy and on the Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism and the implementation of European CT-related legislation in member states; 
additionally the office has published occasionally EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
discussion papers with updates and recommendations on the European CT legal-
institutional framework. Following the introduction of the European Union Strategy for 
Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism (2005), some measures listed in 
the European CT Action Plan were transferred in the new EU Action Plan for Combating 
Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism (2005). This plan remains classified, though 
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it was partially declassified in 2010 and shows only the titles of 14 measures and 
actions.85  
 
Year 2001 2002–2003 2004 2005 2006 2007–2009 2010–2012 
EU Action Plan on 
Combating Terrorism 
(Measures/Actions) 
41 64 164 203 138 139 37 
Table 1.   EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism—Updates 2001–2012 (After:86) 
Analysis of published EU Action Plans on Combating Terrorism since 2001 
shows that the Action Plan was updated seven times. It started from a modest 41 
measures in 2001, grew slowly to 64 in the period 2002–2003, and then rapidly increased 
in 2004 after the Madrid attacks to 164 measures and again after the London bombings to 
its maximum of 203 active CT measures and actions (Table 1). After the European CT 
Strategy was adopted in 2006, many of measures were executed and Action Plan ended 
2006 with 138 active CT measures and actions, which remained steady in period 2008–
2009 (139 measures). The list shows only 37 active CT measures and actions in 2010, 
which owes something to measures having been executed and also can be related to 
reorganization of EU institutions in light of the Lisbon Treaty. Some measures and 
actions were redirected to the other specific (and some confidential) CT Action Plans, for 
example, the EU Action Plan for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to 
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Terrorism,87 the EU Action Plan to Take Forward Customs Counterterrorism 
Initiatives,88 the EU CBRN Action Plan,89 the Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection (CIIP) Action Plan,90 or the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of 
Explosives.91  
Since the European CT Strategy was adopted in 2005, the whole European CT 
framework has come to encompass four strands of work (prevent, protect, pursue, and 
response) to fulfill the main strategic commitment, namely “to combat terrorism globally 
while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an 
area of freedom, security and justice.”92 Has the EU succeeded in this CT strategic 
commitment? 
1. Prevent 
The objective of the EU under the prevent pillar of the European CT Strategy is 
“to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can 
lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally.”93 The cornerstone 
of the “prevent” pillar is the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment 
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(2005), which was revised in November 2008. Since then, 17 member states have 
developed national strategies to prevent radicalization and extremism, and five of them 
have specific activities on de-radicalization and disengagement. The Framework Decision 
on Combating Terrorism (2002) was amended in 2008 and came into force in December 
2010 with important prevention-related amendments that allow the prosecution of people 
who organize terrorist recruitment (including on the Internet), as well as spreading 
information that can be used to commit terrorist attacks (for example, bomb-making 
recipes).94 In this connection, an important initiative of the EU Commission has been the 
development of a public-private partnership in the CT-related use of the Internet because 
almost all Internet providers in Europe are private companies.95 Furthermore, the EU and 
its members have launched many initiatives in order to fight extremism and 
radicalization. These initiatives have been spearheaded by particular member states but 
they are of use to all and mostly funded by the EU.96 Nevertheless, qualitative and 
quantitative assessments are rare, and therefore the EU Commission plan is that in 
cooperation with member states first develop reliable indicators and later analyze 
effectiveness of measures.97  
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The objective of the “protect” pillar of the European CT Strategy is “to protect 
citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through 
improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure.”98 One of the most 
important CT-related measures in the “protect” area is the introduction of the European 
Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection in 2006 (reviewed 2011), which was 
followed by a list of critical facilities, related protection standards, and many new 
measures and actions, such as: EU network of laboratories for testing and certification of 
security solutions, list of actions to protect information systems, and the Security of 
Explosives Action Plan and 50 concrete actions to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks 
with explosives.99 Also, in order to support further development in area of security and 
CT, the EU established a special program for research and technological development 
that received an impressive €1.4 billion budget for the period 2007–2013.  Many 
initiatives have been made concerning the improvement of border security, especially 
through new technologies, like biometric passports that help thwart multiple asylum 
applications, and in the development of integrated border management systems like 
“entry-exit system” that tracks the mobility of third-country nationals in the EU.100 
Within transport security, the EU has introduced many new rules and regulations, 
especially in civil aviation and maritime transport, like clearly standardized levels of 
threats and related security actions, new technologies to defeat efforts by terrorists to 
procure dangerous substances (e.g., liquid explosives), and human rights sensitive new 
standards for security scanners at EU ports (2010).101 Furthermore, in the last six years, 
the EU has adopted more than twenty important framework programs, action plans, and 
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legal measures that reinforce some older official CT activities, as well as enhancing a 
wide range of new public-private CT activities.102   
3. Pursue  
The objective of the EU under the “pursue” pillar of the European CT Strategy is 
“to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally; to impede planning, 
travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to 
attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice.”103 A significant number of measures 
were introduced enhancing the gathering and simplifying exchange of information and 
intelligence between the CT-related EU and member-state institutions, such as the 
European Evidence Warrant that has simplified the exchange of evidence between 
member states.104 Europol and Eurojust have contributed significantly to the many areas 
of the CT strategy, especially with various of effectiveness analyses, sensitive data 
exchange, training support, and Joint Investigations Teams.105 Furthermore, the 
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Commission has developed several CT pursue-related laws and operational measures that 
have yielded valuable results--amid some controversy about human rights, especially in 
regards to those measures related to individual data exchange and combating terrorist 
financing.106 
4. Response 
The objective of the EU under the “response” pillar is “to prepare ourselves, in 
the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack, by 
improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath; the co-ordination of the response; and 
the needs of victims.”107 The EU has its framework decision and related regulations on 
the standing of victims in criminal proceedings and on compensation for more than 
decade, including victims of terrorist attack.108 The EU provides an average of €1.8 
million a year to help terrorism-related victims and their families to recover.109  The EU 
Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) has been developed since 2001 and 
today is the cornerstone of the EU response efforts.110 It is continuously reinforced every 
year and insures fast response by capabilities of all member states in “any type of natural 
or man-made disaster, such as earthquakes, floods, forest fires, industrial accidents, 
                                                 
 
106 Important European CT-related initiatives that have been executed under “pursue” pillar and 
listed in the latest CT Action Plan are: National Structures for Counter Terrorism (established in more than 
half of member states), Information Sharing Mechanism on Changes in the National Threat Level (2011, 
provides by SitCen), Prüm decisions (2008, automated data exchange regarding DNA, fingerprints and 
vehicle registration data), Passenger Name Records (PNR, 2011, tool to detect terrorist networks and 
movements), EU-US Agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP, 2010), Joint 
investigation teams (JITs) Experts Network (JIT EN, 2010), European Criminal Records Information 
System (ECRIS, 2012), and Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing (2008); Council of the European 
Union, “EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, December 9, 2011,” 25-39; European Commission, “The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges,”  8, See on security vs. human 
rights more in Chapter III, Section B and D. 
107 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 3. 
108 European Commission Home Affairs, “Victims,” European Commission, accessed November 
2, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-
terrorism/victims/index_en.htm.  
109 European Commission Home Affairs, “Victims.”  
110  “All 27 member states of the EU and the 3 EEA countries, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein 
as well as Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, participate in the mechanism.”; 





marine pollution or terrorist attacks.”111 So far, the CCPM has 128 modules in high 
readiness and eight technical and assistance teams.112 The mechanism has been activated 
more than hundred times in recent years;113 for example, in the period 2010–2011 it was 
activated 46 times, 15 times within and 31 times outside the EU.114  A recent 
Eurobarometer survey shows that 82 percent of Europeans agree that the CCPM is more 
effective in response to major crisis than actions taken by individual member states.115 
Although the CCPM was activated mostly for natural disasters in recent years, the EU 
has organized many training sessions, including annual exercises in CT response. 
Furthermore, the EU has developed framework programs to join member states 
capabilities, including important program and related regulations in case of chemical, 
                                                 
 
111 European CCPM applies the EU member states, but may be also apply to other non-EU 
countries – “any country in the world can call on the European Civil Protection Mechanism for 
assistance.”; Reliefweb, “Questions and Answers on European Civil Protection Mechanism,” accessed 
November 2, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/questions-and-answers-european-civil-protection-
mechanism.  
112 “e.g. water purification, high capacity pumping, urban search and rescue, aerial and ground 
forest fire fighting, CBRN detection and sampling, medium and heavy urban search and rescue in CBRN 
conditions, forest fire fighting, and medical assistance (advanced medical post with surgery and medical 
aerial evacuation of disaster victims, field hospital), flood containment, flood rescue, temporary shelters.”; 
Council of the European Union, “EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, December 9, 2011,” 42. 
113 Some of large actions include responses to Greece forest fires in 2009 and 2012, earthquake in 
Italy in 2009, chemical pollution in Hungary in 2010, as well as outside of EU responding to the Asian 
tsunami in 2004, the hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Reliefweb, “Questions 
and Answers on European Civil Protection Mechanism”; European Commission, “Annual Report on the 
European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their implementation in 2010,” 
(Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, COM/2011/0343 final, 2011), accessed November 2, 2012, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0343:FIN:EN:HTML.  
114 European Commission, “Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Policies and their implementation in 2010”; European Commission, “Annual Report on the 
European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their implementation in 2011,” 
(Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, COM(2012) 489 final, 2012), accessed November 2, 2012, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0489:FIN:EN:PDF.  
115 European Commission, “Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil 




biological, radiological, and nuclear disaster, which has special regulations in case of 
terrorist CBRN attacks.116 
The EU has introduced hundreds of CT-related EU regulations, directives, 
decisions, working documents, and other EU legal documents. Although research into the 
EU Documents Public Register is very demanding and takes a lot of time, Maria O’Neill 
in The Evolving Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework provides the most accurate list of 
271 EU documents that have a direct or indirect relationship with the European CT 
framework.117     Of these documents, the Treaty of Lisbon118 brings to the European CT 
framework the most significant changes in way of execution as well as in EU structure 
and institutional powers, such as: (a) the EU decision-making process is changed from 
the unanimity rule to a qualified majority vote (QMV, simplified decisions); (b) the 
European Parliament got stronger oversight role and full co-decisional powers; (c) the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction is extended and now covers all issues in the 
area of freedom, security, and justice (FSJ), yet effectively after November 30, 2014 
(ECJ is able to penalize slow implementation of EU measures, including CT); (d) EU 
agencies Europol, Eurojust, and Frontex have a legal personality (able to be party in 
international agreements); (e) a new EU Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) 
was created in the Council related to operational cooperation on internal security with 
members from national security services; (f) the Lisbon Treaty promotes the “solidarity 
clause “ (Lisbon Treaty, Article 222: “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly 
                                                 
 
116 Important European CT-related initiatives that have been executed under “response” pillar and 
listed in the latest CT Action Plan are: Proposal of expanding the provisions of Framework Decision (2001) 
on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings (2011), EU CBRN Action Plan (2009, preventive, 
detection and response measures ), and EU Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM, 2007); 
Council of the European Union, “EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, December 9, 2011,” 40-48. 
117 O. Neill, The Evolving EU Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework, xi-xxxiii.  This work 
includes 33 international treaties and agreements of the EU, four international Treaties and agreements of 
the Council of Europe, 12 other international treaties and agreements, eight protocols to treaties, 32 EU 
regulations, 18 directives, 13 Council acts, 6 Council common positions, 19 framework decisions, 73 
Council decisions, 17 joint actions, 11 other EU legal documents, 7 Commission staff working documents, 
and 18 strategy documents. 
118 The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force December 1, 2009, and amends the current EU and 
EC treaties mostly with institutional issues; Europa: Treaty of Lisbon, ”The Treaty at a Glance,” Europa, 




in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of 
a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its 
disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.”); (g) 
regarding to external security and CT, the Lisbon Treaty states that Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions can contribute to the fight against terrorism, as well 
as the EU can support non-EU countries in CT in their countries.119 The Lisbon Treaty 
did not diminish any European CT institutional authorities; rather, it expanded the 
oversight and legislative authorities of the European Parliament, which has nudged recent 
CT directives, regulations, and international agreements in more a human rights-sensitive 
direction. It is significant that since the Lisbon Treaty came into power, no major 
European CT-related document has been challenged before the ECJ, and even the United 
States has relented during recent negotiations on some CT agreements with EU.120 
Ten years after 9/11, the European CT framework remains under construction, but 
the positive outcome is the fact that all of the main CT-related Council framework 
decisions, the European CT strategy, and the CT-related EU institutions are so far still in 
effect. Except for the strategy, some CT-related Council decisions, especially those 
related to EU institutions, were amended several times, but always toward wider and 
stronger CT authorities, and without degrading any of previous given capabilities. Thus, 
the evolution of the European CT legal-institutional framework is still not finished, but 
because of the simplified decision-making process and stronger CT institutions after the 
Lisbon Treaty, it is possible to expect even faster and more comprehensive development 
in some of CT areas where member states have been reluctant to full cooperate before.  
D. KEY INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO EU COUNTERTERRORISM  
This section examines four of the EU institutions with the greatest influence and 
the most direct operational tasks in the European CT efforts: the European Police Office 
                                                 
 
119 Thomas Renard, “EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions after the Lisbon Treaty,” 
Policy Brief (September 2012), Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, accessed October 13, 
2012, http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/Renard_policybrief_1216.pdf. 




(Europol), European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), EU Counterterrorism 
Coordinator (EU CTC), and the EU Joint Situation Center (EU JSC, SitCen). To be sure, 
among the rest of the EU bodies, the European Police College (CEPOL),121 the 
European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force (PCOTF),122 and the FRONTEX 
Agency123 are the most active in support of the European CT, but they are not analyzed 
here because these institutions are still not significant contributors to the European CT 
framework.      
1. Europol 
Emerging from the original idea to have some formal cooperation between 
European law-enforcement forces in the 1970s, with the TREVI group as a cornerstone 
the Maastricht Treaty mandated the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol) 
with mission to provide “police cooperation between member states to combat terrorism, 
drug trafficking and other international crime.”124 The following year, Europol 
                                                 
 
121 European Police College (CEPOL): Established as formal EU institution in 2005 
(2005/681/JHA), the CEPOL Secretariat is in Bramshill, UK. CEPOL  task is to help in training of senior 
police officers from the EU member states. It organizes 60-100 courses per year, but mostly works as a 
network and share training programs with many National Police Colleges. Regarding to CT, CEPOL 
provides one specialized course on combating terrorism; European Police College, “About Cepol,” 
accessed October 13, 2012, https://www.cepol.europa.eu/index.php?id=training-learning.  
122 European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force (PCOTF): Established as working group in 
2000 following conclusions from the EU Tampere Summit in October 1999, yet to the end does not have 
legal basis in the EU. “PCOTF concerns several counter-terrorism issues, such as the operational analysis 
of ‘Islamic Extremist Terrorism,’ terrorism threat assessments, the financing of terrorism, and weapons of 
mass destruction.” Mathieu Deflem, “Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-
Terrorism in a Global Perspective,” Justice Quarterly 23, no.3 (2006): 336-359, accessed October 13, 
2012, http://deflem.blogspot.com/2006/08/europol-and-policing-of-international.html. 
123 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX): Established in 2004 in order “to reinforce and 
streamline cooperation between national border authorities” with joint operations, training, risk analysis, 
research, providing a rapid response capability, assisting member states in joint return operations, and 
providing information sharing system; FRONTEX, “Mission and Tasks,” accessed October 13, 2012, 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks;  “FRONTEX has not yet been involved directly in 
CT work but is associated with the border security aspects of the EU and UN Global CT strategies.” ; EU 
Counterterrorism Coordinator, “EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Discussion Paper,” (Brussels, Belgium: 
EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Document 9990/12, May 23,2012), 3, accessed October 13, 2012, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st09/st09990.en12.pdf.   





commenced work through Europol Drugs Unit (EDU, 1993), and the EDU paved the way 
for the convention establishing Europol (1995), and after its ratification to a fully-fledged 
Europol on October 1, 1998. The organization is headquartered in The Hague, 
Netherlands.125 The convention required member states to designate a national unit to 
liaise with Europol, and to second liaison officers to the Europol headquarters. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam provides Europol a mandate as the main EU law-enforcement 
coordination point and introduced the idea of Europol Joint Investigation Teams 
(JITs).126 Recently, the EU Council (Tampere, October 1999) requested that “joint 
investigative teams… be set up without delay, as a first step, to combat trafficking in 
drugs and human beings as well as terrorism.”127 Although, the Europol was constantly in 
transition in first two years while trying to enhance operational activities, its role was 
expanded in 1994, and member states were requested to implement several EU legal 
instruments, which make Europol key in the EU fight against serious international 
organized crime and terrorism with high-quality information from member states.128 On 
April 6, 2009, the EU Council adopted a decision129 that extended Europol’s mandate and 
tasks (data processing, protection and operational capabilities) and makes Europol as an 
EU agency equal to other bodies and agencies in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of 
the EU. Now, Europol is financed from the EU budget, falls under the EU financial and 
staff regulations, and is subject to EU oversight.130 
Today, Europol has developed into a respectable EU law-enforcement agency 
with more than 700 staff—130 seconded from 27 EU member states and some from 
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partner states131—that support national law enforcement agencies through “gathering, 
analyzing, and disseminating information and coordinating operations,” as well as 
through participation of Europol’s experts and analysts in Joint Investigation Teams 
serious criminal cases in EU countries.132 Among the JIT, analyses are important part of 
Europol activities that employs more than 100 the best European criminal analysts, who 
provide analyses and threat assessments for member states—for example daily and long 
term threat assessments; the European Organized Crime Threat Assessment, OCTA, an 
annually published CT-related report; and the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 
TE-SAT.133 Today, Europol is organized as the EU’s law-enforcement hub or a police 
operational center that operates non-stop and deal with more than 10,000 cases a year.134 
Europol has successfully launched and maintained several counterterrorism 
programs: Counter Terrorist Program (analyzes information, provides threat assessments 
and JIT); Counter Proliferation Program (monitors trafficking of nuclear material, arms, 
explosives, etc.); Networking Program (establishes effective contacts between 
counterterrorist authorities from EU and third countries); Preparedness Program  (relates 
to the readiness of multilateral investigative teams); Training and Education Program 
(provides experts in area of police training; and as an institutional measure, the Europol 
Task Force for the Fight against Terrorism (collect, analyze and assess terrorism-related 
intelligence and CT security measures across the EU).135  
                                                 
 
131 “Europol cooperates with a number of Non–EU countries and organizations, but also EU 
agencies and institutions, for example (in alphabetical order): Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Canada, CEPOL (European Police College), Colombia, Croatia, Eurojust, European Central Bank, 
European Commission, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Frontex, Iceland, Interpol, Moldova, Norway, OLAF (European Anti–Fraud 
Office), Russian Federation, Serbia, Switzerland, SITCEN (EU Joint Situation Centre), Turkey, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, USA, World Customs Organization.”; Europol, “Frequently Asked 
Questions: International Operations,” accessed October 6, 2012, https://www.europol.europa.eu/faq#n109.  









[Furthermore,] [i]n addition to its support to Member States’ terrorist 
investigations and its participation in joint investigation teams, Europol 
has developed or is in the process of developing a set of useful CT 
products/instruments including the TE-SAT report (supported by 
Eurojust), the explosive/CBRN databases, “check the web,” the European 
Cybercrime Centre (by 2013), and the First Responders Network, used for 
the first time in the wake of the Breivik case in July 2011.136 
2.  Eurojust 
The first idea for the establishment of a judicial cooperation unit in the EU was 
introduced at the EU Council Summit in Tampere in October 1999; the first provisional 
judicial cooperation unit (Pro-Eurojust) was established on March 1, 2001.137  Post-9/11 
urgency led to the faster establishment of the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation 
Unit (Eurojust) on February 28, 2002 (Council Decision 2002/187/JHA); its full 
operational capabilities were reached in January 2003, after the Rules of Procedure were 
agreed.138 Eurojust headquarters is in The Hague, Netherland, and is “composed of 
national prosecutors, magistrates, or police officers of equivalent competence, detached 
from each Member State according to their own legal systems.”139 Furthermore, 
cooperation agreements to exchange of judicial information have been concluded with 
Europol, Norway, Iceland, the United States., Croatia, European Anti–Fraud Office 
(OLAF), Switzerland, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; in addition, 
liaison prosecutors from Norway, the United States., and Croatia are based at Eurojust 
headquarters.140 Eurojust has 269 personnel, of whom 49 are seconded from member 
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states to serve as prosecutors, judges, and police officers. Other 210 staff members are 
employed under EU staff regulations.141  
Eurojust stimulates and improves the coordination of investigations and 
prosecutions between the competent authorities in the Member States and 
improves the cooperation between the competent authorities of the 
Member States, in particular by facilitating the execution of international 
mutual legal assistance and the implementation of extradition requests. 
Eurojust competence covers the same types of crime and offences for 
which Europol has competence, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, 
trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting, money laundering, computer 
crime, crime against property or public goods including fraud and 
corruption, criminal offences affecting the European Community’s 
financial interests, environmental crime and participation in a criminal 
organization.142 
Since its establishment, Eurojust’s activities in European judicial cooperation 
have grown rapidly, especially following the Madrid and later London terrorist attacks. 
The Eurojust Counterterrorism Team was established in 2004 with tasks to organize 
Eurojust and partners CT-related meetings, to build up a legal database (CT-related 
legislation, cases and verdicts), and to provide data for Europol reports (TE-SAT).143 
Important issues in EU judicial cooperation were solved in December 2008, when the EU 
Council adopted broader operational capabilities for Eurojust in the areas of international 
data exchange, relationships with non-EU states, and establishing a Eurojust desk for 
24/7 support of national judicial authorities.144  
Eurojust has been very active. Eurojust deals with about 30 cases related to 
terrorism (serious and mostly multilateral cases) every year. It organizes regular meetings 
                                                 
 
141 Eurojust, Eurojust Annual Report 2011 (The Hague, Netherlands: Eurojust, 2012), accessed 
October 11, 2012, 
http://eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202011
/Annual-Report-2011-EN.pdf.  
142 Eurojust, “Background, Mission and Tasks,” accessed October 6, 2012, 
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on terrorism with judicial authorities of the EU and third states, as well as the EU 
member states have to have liaison for national correspondence with Eurojust about 
terrorism.145  Beside the classical Eurojust tasks, it monitors the judicial application of 
the European CT legislation, facilitates discussion of criminal policy, including CT, 
within the EU, participates in Joint Investigation Teams with Europol, and helps to 
engage EU’s international CT partners.146 Furthermore, “[s]ince 2008 Eurojust has 
developed a regular Terrorism Convictions Monitor (TCM) as well as a Memorandum on 
Terrorism Financing which provide a regular overview of developments throughout the 
EU.”147 
Since the establishment of Eurojust, the total number of cases that have been 
coordinated by Eurojust has witnessed an exponential growth, from 202 cases in 2002 to 
1441 in 2011 (Table 2). In terrorism-related cases, its number follows trend of court cases 
and convicted terrorists in period after 9/11, starting with 18 cases in 2002, reaching a 
maximum of 44 cases in 2006, than slowly decreasing to 27 cases in 2011 (Table 2).148 
Furthermore, during the period 2002–2011, more than 25 percent of coordinating cases 
and more than 70 percent of coordinating meetings have been multilateral (three or more 
countries), which after analysis of serious cases mentioned in Eurojust annual reports, 
leads to the conclusion that terrorism-related cases and meetings have been represented 
much more often in multilateral than in bilateral cases.149  
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146 Gilles de Kerchove, “Speech delivered by the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de 
Kerchove at the Opening Ceremony for the 10th Anniversary of EUROJUST,” (The Hague, Netherlands, 
28 February 2012), Council  of the European Union, accessed October 9, 2012, 
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148  See data in Chapter IV. 
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Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Eurojust 
Cases 202 300 381 588 771 1085 1193 1372 1424 1441 
Terrorism 
Related Cases 18 18 33 25 44 23 31 21 28 27 
Table 2.   Eurojust coordinated cases 2002–2011 (After:150) 
European CT has been priority for the establishment of Eurojust, its activities and 
the further development of its authorities, and over the last decade, Eurojust has become a 
significant contributor to the overall CT framework.151 For the most part, Eurojust 
facilitates cooperation between two or more EU member states, many times including 
non-EU states, in terrorism-related cases. It also participates with Europol in terrorism-
related Joint Investigation Teams, supports the execution of European Arrest Warrants, 
publishes the Terrorism Conviction Monitor (two to three times per year, documenting 
best practices through judicial case analyses), organizes strategic and tactical meetings on 
terrorism law, contributes to Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports, and 
exchanges sensitive terrorism-related judicial data with Europol, OLAF, and Frontex. In 
the future, Eurojust contribution to the European CT efforts can be even more significant, 
especially if it succeeds in establishing Eurojust liaison magistrates in third countries, 
which will boost judicial cooperation and investigations in cases that include these 
countries—Bosnia, Algeria, Egypt, Kosovo, etc.152 These third-country cases often 
involve terrorism or offenses that contribute to or support terrorism. 
The EU role in the promotion of a criminal justice approach to terrorism-related 
cases in Eurojust, and this combination of senior magistrates, prosecutors, judges and 
other legal experts, is “an effective and streamlined instrument to assist cooperation, 
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investigation, and gathering of evidence across borders.”153  The most important value-
added Eurojust outcomes in European CT are trust promotion as a pre-condition for 
cross-border cooperation in CT and the facilitation of prosecution to overcome the lack of 
knowledge, different legal standards, bad experience, and traditional conservatism among 
the member states.154 The development of Eurojust under the frame of terrorism as also 
has provided important lessons learned into many other areas of the EU, especially 
regarding information sharing.155  
3. EU Counterterrorism Coordinator 
In 2004, the EU Council established the position of EU Counterterrorism 
Coordinator under the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, tasked to increase EU oversight and accountability for all CT efforts.156 This 
special assignment within the Council Secretariat was initiated because of the visible 
implementation gap for CT measures after the 2002 Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism and the new wave of European CT-related enthusiasm after the Madrid 
terrorist attacks.157 Despite these heady beginnings, the CTC’s authorities were limited 
from the outset. They include: (1) analysis of CT measures with an eye toward how it can 
be done better; (2) preparatory CT-related work in order to inform Council members in 
advance of serious CT decisions; and (3) coordination of the European CT policy among 
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(calendar year 2011),” (Luxemburg: Council of the European Union, June 8, 2012), accessed August 16, 
2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/130720.pdf. 
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EU institutions.158 Even with limited oversight and coordination authorities and without 
any powers that can influence implementation of CT measures, the CTC succeeded in 
first few years to solidify its role mostly because of the low profile of the first CTC Gijs 
de Vries—non-confrontation with member states—its approach, and the support of the 
EU administration. At the end of 2007, the new CTC Gilles de Kerchove introduced a 
new approach to the issue through additional tasks: coordination of the EU Council CT-
related work; keeping records (an overview) of all European CT measures; oversight 
implementation of the EU Counterterrorism Strategy; and supporting an active CT role 
for the EU.159 After the Lisbon Treaty was adopted in 2009 and the Maastricht Treaty 
(including later Amsterdam and Nice updates) pillar structure was removed, the CTC 
office retained its unique position between all major EU sectors—European External 
Action Service (EEAS), Directorate General of Justice (DG Justice), and Directorate 
General Home Affairs (DG HOME).160 Although the CTC office is composed of just the 
coordinator and a few assistants, this function represents a precedent because it is only 
one existing coordinator position in wider EU policies, which definitely shows the 
importance that the EU puts on CT efforts. 
To date, the most significant outcomes of the CTC office are its unified report 
(every six months) on execution of measures listed in the European CT Action Plan and 
its active role in preparatory work (together with EU Commission and EU Presidency) on 
all CT-related documents and decisions for the EU Council or the EU Parliament 
meetings.161   
The Council of the European Union calls upon the EU Counterterrorism 
Coordinator [to be] consistent with his or her existing mandate, to 
continue to contribute to ensuring the implementation and evaluation of 
the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy as well as coordination and coherence 
                                                 
 
158 EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, “The EU’s Response to the Threat of Terrorism,” 
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between the various policy strands in the implementation of the Strategy, 
to support, in close cooperation with the Member States, the EEAS and the 
Commission, coordination and coherence between the EU’s internal and 
external CT policies, and to foster better communication between the 
Union and third countries.162      
4. The EU Joint Situation Center  
Although, European states have been actively sharing intelligence through 
bilateral agreements since the 1970s—a limited multilateral approach was adopted in 
1990s because of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia—the first formal, institutionalized 
approach to EU-wide intelligence sharing happened after 9/11 with establishment of the 
EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen).163 According to Eurowatch research on SitCen, its 
function and staff also can be traced to the analysis cell of the West European Union 
(WEU) military staff, then later as a part of the EU Military Staff, and finally as a part of 
the EU.164 An idea for an EU intelligence-related Situation Centre came about during the 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy (Council of Cologne, 1999), 
which proposed a formal EU intelligence analysis cell under the EU High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Secretary General of the Council 
Secretariat.165  In the wake of the 9/11, SitCen was established initially as the forum for 
several166 EU intelligence agencies within the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG, 2001), 
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but without formal status as EU agency.167 It is important to note, then, that “9/11 and the 
terrorist attacks in Madrid and London served as major impetuses towards increased 
intelligence sharing and the creation of SitCen.”168 
Initially, SitCen operated as an EU crisis response center with information from 
open sources and with a focus on the EU-external threats. However, the Madrid and 
London attacks militated for an increase of intelligence sharing, especially CT-related, 
and over the years, SitCen’s mandate has expanded. Today, the center covers external as 
well as internal threats for the EU.169 SitCen’s mission and tasks have been never 
published by the EU, but according to the analysis of the Cross-border Research 
Association on the EU Situation Center, its main tasks are: monitoring 24/7 world events 
and producing daily press summaries; serving as the EU’s point of contact in times of 
crisis; preparing SitCen reports and analyses;170 contributing to the development of new 
CT instruments; communicating and coordinating with EU member states’ national 
security and intelligence agencies; and serving as the focal point for CSDP international 
operations, which includes capability to initiate fast EU responses to major incidents 
within those missions (early warning system).171 Furthermore, the analysis point out that 
SitCen operates the COREU information system (EU secret) and the New 
Communications Network (for EU delegations abroad). It manages satellite images from 
member states and the United States, supports and accompanies high EU officials while 
travelling, and also coordinates between the EU member states and third states in any 
crisis that involves citizens of two or more EU member states. Its headquarters are in 
                                                 
 
167 “The CTG was formed after the attacks of 9-11, as a Dutch initiative of the so called ‘Club de 
Bern’, an informal gathering of the heads of the security and intelligence services of the EU member states 
as well as Norway and Sweden.”; Buuren, Secret Truth,  9-10. 
168 Cross, “EU Intelligence Sharing & The Joint Situation Centre.” 
169 Buuren, Secret Truth, 9-10. 
170 SitCen reports/analyses provide security related information primarily for the EU Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), but also for other working groups like, Terrorism Working Group (TWG), 
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Brussels and it has more than 110 staff members who can execute tasks in all EU 
languages, as well as Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Russian, etc.172 
On December 1, 2010 SitCen become a part of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS),173 which finally gave it a formal status (though it is still not an official 
agency), and better funding from the Community budget.174 On January 1, 2011, SitCen 
was renamed in the European Union Intelligence Analysis Center (IntCen), but its core 
tasks remain unchanged.175 On March 16, 2012, the number of IntCen personnel 
decreased from 110 to 70, following the restructuring of its two main divisions, the 
Analysis Division, which conducts strategic analyses, and the General and External 
Relations Division, responsible for legal and administrative issues and open-source 
analysis. 176 Some of SitCen’s previous functions in this restructuring moved to other 
EEAS bodies, such as: service for the EU representatives abroad (consular affairs), the 
watch keeping capability (24/7 Duty Area), and the secure communication sector (for 
example, COREU).177 
Many decisions of the EU Council and other bodies have been adopted referring 
to SitCen reports/analyses, yet because of the secrecy there are no published SitCen 
documents and regarding to its results only information is that “SitCen has issued more 
than 150 reports per year to Council bodies on major issues in the field of CFSP and the 
threat posed to the Union by terrorism (Council of the European Union 2007b: 52).”178 
The Eurowatch analysis on SitCen points out that “no information was found on the 
substance of reports produced by SitCen.”179 Although, secrecy caused absence of 
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evidence on SitCen/IntCen CT activities, yet its recent repositioning within the EU 
bodies was probably driven by lessons learned and shows SitCen/IntCen importance for 
the EU decision makers and member states.   
E. CONCLUSION 
September 11 was the decisive point in the recent European CT response, built up 
as broad set of legislation, institutions, and individual measures and actions. 
Nevertheless, policy conflicts emerged soon after further terrorist activities extended 
acceptance of the European CT products in member states, which caused delays in the 
development and implementation of the European CT framework as whole.180 
Furthermore, in the absence of a unitary or comprehensive strategic European CT vision, 
the EU Council sporadically supported the EU Commission in its proposals for 
development of a CT legal-institutional framework. Thus, after 9/11, the EU Commission 
leveraged member states’ pro-CT willingness to advance the ambitious Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism and the European Arrest 
Warrant.181  
After the European CT framework was adopted, member states were divided in 
their view of a strategic CT approach.182 However, in the wake of the attacks in Madrid 
(2004) and London (2005), the EU Council finally reached a consensus, culminating in 
the four-pronged EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.183 Although the EU Commission 
balanced between different levels of willingness among member states and the necessity 
to develop and implement quality CT measures, the European CT strategy and later many 
CT-related measures were finally introduced and the implementation level improved.  
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In light of this analysis of the evolution of the European CT framework over last 
ten years, it is obvious that the EU has developed comprehensive legal-institutional 
response to terrorism, yet in order to achieve full CT operational capabilities, it is 
necessary to speed up work in some areas, especially where member states were resisting 
giving the EU larger part of their sovereignty, for example, cross-border investigations or 
intelligence sharing. Examination of key CT-related institutions—Europol, Eurojust, 
European CTC, and the EU JSC—shows that they became added value to the member 
states in European terrorism response, just as the EU promised in its CT Strategy for 
development of collective CT capabilities, “[e]nsuring EU level capacity to understand 
and make collective policy responses to the terrorist threat, and making best use of the 
capability of EU bodies.”184   
                                                 
 








III. SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY: THE EU 
COUNTERTERRORISM FRAMEWORK SOLUTIONS 
Some experts and EU authorities argue that the EU legal and institutional CT 
measures do not conflict with human rights.185 Other observers take a more reserved 
position and argue that the European CT measures have “sufficient” level of human-
rights protections, but they are not completely unscathed by the “security versus liberty” 
dilemma.186 The balance requires much consideration and frequent adjustment amid 
shifting threats on the one hand and democratic principles on the other—all refracted 
through the lens of public expectations. For the EU, the dilemma intersects the challenge 
of multilateralism and member states’ prerogatives, particularly in light of the varying 
extent to which EU law has been incorporated into the domestic law of all EU states.187  
This chapter presents case studies of important European CT legal-institutional 
measures and European solutions that may be used as lessons learned: the European 
Arrest Warrant; the Money Laundering Directives (including terrorist financing); targeted 
sanctions related to UN Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1373; and the strategic CT 
partnership with the U.S. (including case study of Passenger Name Records data 
exchange). These CT measures have been often used as examples in literature, as well as 
challenged in front of national and European courts (ECJ, ECHR) as European CT 
measures that violate the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.   
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On the matter of human rights at the Union level, various “watch keepers” 
constantly oversee all EU actions in developing and maintaining the CT legal-
institutional framework, including the EU member states, the European Parliament, ECJ, 
and ECHR, as well as some NGOs. This mix of official and unofficial oversight has 
prompted several changes to proposals and even annulments of final decisions or 
agreements. In other words, the EU has been assiduous, even activist, in ensuring that 
hard-won European civil liberties are preserved to the extent possible in all CT measures. 
Still, there are some unclear provisions in CT measures that can be interpreted in 
different ways and leave space for possible violations of human rights in member states’ 
implementation acts.  
A. EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT  
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is one of the 9/11 reaction measures 
adopted by the Council Framework Decision on June 13, 2002. After it entered into force 
on January 1, 2004, the EAW has provided a valuable instrument for the member states 
judicial authority.188 It replaces the old extradition system regulated by bilateral 
agreements, as well as several earlier European Union decisions.189 Although the EAW 
was adopted as the first post-9/11 EU counterterrorism measure, according to the Council 
framework decision, it is applicable in all other criminal offences, including participation 
in a criminal organization, trafficking (in human beings, narcotics, cultural goods, or 
weapons), rape and child pornography, corruption, fraud, money laundering, cyber-crime, 
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environmental crime, murder, racism and xenophobia, armed robbery, racketeering and 
extortion, arson, counterfeiting, sabotage, and crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC.190  
According to the latest European Commission report on the implementation of the 
EAW in period between 2005 and 2009, the results of the EAW are remarkable. Member 
states issued 54,689 EAWs. Of them, 11630—or 21 percent—were executed; 55 percent 
of persons consented to their surrender. For persons who waive extradition (that is, who 
consents to the surrender), the average time between arrest and the decision to extradite is 
15.7 days. Otherwise, 48.3 days is the average time between arrest and the decision on 
the surrender for persons who do not consent to the surrender.191 Before the EAW, the 
average time between the issue of a request for extradition and the decision to execute 
was one year.  
According to Amnesty International, “[t]he Framework Decision on the … EAW 
… is not of itself a threat to the protection of human rights.”192 Indeed, the EAW even 
stresses obligations to respect the civil liberties and human dignity of the subject to be 
extradited, and it instructs judges to refuse to surrender arrested person if there is any 
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possibility that the requesting member state will violate the individual’s human rights.193 
On the other hand, several member states, EU institutions, NGOs, and even some 
individuals point out significant shortcomings with the EAW, including violations of 
human rights.194 Members of the European Parliament (MEP), in a debate held on June 
6, 2011, pointed out three main flaws related to EAW in accordance with EU official 
reports, NGO suggestions, and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) related 
cases:195  
(1) EAW is abused by some member states through disproportional use in minor 
offences, which lead often to violation of human rights and large financial 
costs for arrested persons.  
(2) Some executing member state courts have no mechanism to explore human 
rights consequences of surrendered persons in EAW-issuing states, which led 
to hasty extradition and, many times, violations of the surrendered person’s 
human rights.  
(3) Some issuing member states sent EAWs before the trial process was prepared, 
which led to excessive pre-trial detention of surrender persons, often in 
unacceptable conditions in detention facilities.  
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Disproportional use of the EAW for minor offences is problem in some countries 
that have criminal law that request prosecution of all offences without discretion. For 
example, Poland had issued 31 percent of all EAWs in the period 2005–2009, though its 
population is only 7.6 percent of the EU total. Similarly, Romania issued 11.6 percent of 
all EAWs in the period 2007–2009 (Romania joined EU in 2007), while it accounts for 
just 4 percent of the EU population.196 This overuse of the EAW means extra costs for 
executing member states in terms of police/judicial services, interpreters, legal aid, and 
detention facilities. The European Union has tried to introduce a proportionality 
requirement through revision of the EAW Handbook, and training programs, but to date, 
there are no visible positive effects.197    
Although EU member states should follow the standards of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Commission concluded that surrenders do 
not always comply with EU human rights standards.198 ECHR annual reports between 
2005 and 2011 show that the court arbitrated against EU member states in seven cases of 
torture, 212 cases of inhuman or degrading treatment, and 903 cases of the violation of 
the right to a fair trial.199 Interestingly, those member states that disproportionally use the 
EAW for minor offences are also the main respondents in these ECHR cases—Romania 
has one-third and Poland has one-tenth of all EU ECHR cases for the violation of human 
rights through the EAW.  
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In 2009, the EU Council decided to streamline Eurojust authorities and introduce 
an on-call center, all in the name of bettering the human rights situation in connection 
with the EAW.200 Recently, the European Commission initiated another round of 
activities to prevent violations of human rights related to EAW, such as the Eurojust 
Coordination Center (including the web info-portal), and EAW training programs in 
cooperation with European Judicial Training Network.201            
In sum, the European Arrest Warrant is definitely very successful among the 
introduced post-9/11 EU legal measures. It replaced the traditional bi-lateral extradition 
system with quick administration and execution, limited possibilities for rejecting of an 
execution, decision-making by judicial authorities (no politics), and the option to deny 
extradition in case the issuing state violates or likely will violate human rights. The 
problems that still exist with the EAW are related to the implementation acts on the 
member-state level. Furthermore, European Commission and other EU bodies reacted 
and in order to prevent violations of human rights they have introduced additional 
preventive measures and activities. Ultimately, the EAW “is an innovative and dynamic 
instrument. Since it came into force in 2004 it has given judicial authorities an accessible 
and efficient mechanism to ensure that offenders do not evade justice wherever they may 
hide within the European Union.”202  
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B. MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING DIRECTIVES 
While the execution of terrorist attacks usually does not require a lot of money, 
the preparation phase, to say nothing of recruitment, training, or even propaganda usually 
demands more funding. Thus, combating the financing of terrorism is one of the most 
important preventive CT measures. Although terrorist networks are mostly international, 
any CT response also requires better regional and international coordination. 
International cooperation in the fight against terrorist financing has existed for decades, 
but until recently, its punitive measures were limited to sanctions. The terrorist attacks on 
9/11 clarified the urgency among all global players (UN, U.S., EU, IMF, FATF, etc.) to 
focus on thwarting terrorist financing, and both the quality of cooperation and the 
quantity of regional and international solutions increased rapidly.  
The cornerstone of the European Union legislation against money laundering—as 
a significant aspect of terrorist financing—is the Money Laundering Directive (MLD). 
The MLD was first adopted by the Council of the European Communities203 in 1991, 
according to the globally accepted recommendations and standards of Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), an international organization established by the G7 Summit in 1989 
that “exists for the purpose of protecting the international financial system from misuse 
and to mobilize action to go after criminals and their assets.”204 The first European 
MLDs defined the regulations for combatting the laundering of illicit narcotics profits 
through the financial sector and introduced requirements for customer identification and 
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record keeping, the training of financial staff, and the reporting of suspicious money 
transactions (over €15.000).205  
The second MLD amended the first MLD in 2001, extending the scope of the 
directive from drug trafficking to all serious crime and from the traditional financial 
sector to other areas, including law firms, notary, real estate business, NGOs, auditors, 
external accountants, tax advisors, insurance business, high-value goods business, and 
casinos.206  
The third MLD, adopted in 2005, accorded with the revised FATF 
recommendations, published 2003, and replaced the first MLD (as amended by the 
second MLD).207 It introduced for the first time explicitly the area of terrorist financing 
and updated previous directives with detailed regulations on collecting customer 
information (due diligence) and a reporting regime to the member states.. Furthermore, 
the third MLD calls on member states to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to 
fight money laundering and terrorist financing. 
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The FIU shall be established as a central national unit. It shall be 
responsible for receiving (and to the extent permitted, requesting), 
analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of 
information which concern potential money laundering, potential terrorist 
financing or are required by national legislation or regulation. It shall be 
provided with adequate resources in order to fulfill its tasks. Member 
States shall ensure that the FIU has access, directly or indirectly, on a 
timely basis, to the financial, administrative and law enforcement 
information that it requires to properly fulfill its tasks.208  
The MLDs have been in force more than 20 years and the implementation acts in 
member states have placed MLD-related regulations on almost every area of the life. The 
effectiveness of MLDs is not clear; some believe the complicated implementing 
procedures do make money laundering more difficult, while others express concern about 
the lack of clear evidence necessary to apply the MLD (confidential data of FIUs and law 
enforcement), which is according to them a sign of an ineffectiveness.209 Recently, EU 
Commission lauded the overall positive effects of MLD, but also noted some challenges:  
The results of the [Deloitte] study210 do not suggest the need for a 
fundamental overhaul of the EU regime [MLD], but highlight a number of 
areas where practical improvements could be made (e.g., guidance on the 
risk based approach, ensure better access to information on beneficial 
ownership and politically exposed persons, provide for a more tailored 
approach for small businesses and professionals, etc.).211   
In an important addition, the third MLD provided that the EU Commission can 
issue legally binding measures to clarify some provisions of the MLD. Since 2005, the 
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European Commission has issued several such directives in order to clarify the 
implementation of the MLD in member states, including such issues as: the definition of 
“politically exposed person,” the technical criteria for due-diligence procedures, 
execution of electronic payments rules, the Commission’s implementation powers, and a 
lawyer-client confidentiality.212This last issue—the conflict between lawyer-client 
confidentiality and some regulations of the third MLD—represent a particularly charged 
problem area, which the Commission has attempted to address with its “tailored 
approach,” not least because the rules are still decried as unclear and many times 
characterized as violation of European Convention on Human Rights.213 Under the 
second MLD,  lawyers were subject to MLD provisions only when participating in 
financial or assets transactions (typically as corporate lawyers), but they were “exempt 
from reporting information received in the course of defending or representing a client on 
courts.”214 Member states could arrange for self-reporting from legal professionals to 
their national expert institutions, such as bar associations; only if the authorities later 
confirmed such activities as money laundering or terrorism financing would they report 
their findings to the FIU.   The third MLD expended its application to lawyers who 
participate in financial or real estate transactions, manage money or other assets, open 
bank accounts, or manage companies, trusts or similar structures; it also requested direct 
reporting to the FIU. Like the second MLD, the third MLD exempts lawyer from 
reporting on suspicious transactions in cases that they are representing in trials, but it not 
exempt them from the reporting requirements when somebody asks for legal advice. Still, 
the third MLD requires only the “minimum legislation harmonization,” which leaves 
member states to decide in some circumstances that their lawyers do not fall under the 
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MLD, for example, when legal activities are very limited or no risk of money laundering 
or terrorist financing.      
Not surprisingly, European lawyers engaged their national and international bar 
associations against these provisions of MLD, organizing conferences, public statements, 
working groups, and position papers, and finally referring the matter to the national 
courts and European Court of Justice.215 None of these courts found that EU Money 
Laundering Directives violate European Convention of Human Rights, but they did 
conclude that some provisions of the directives are unclear. For example, the MLD 
implementation act in France was challenged in the French administrative court (under 
Article 6 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights), and in 2008 the 
court found that “no distinction could be drawn between representation in legal 
proceedings on the one hand and legal advice on the other. Information obtained by a 
lawyer in the course of assessing the legal position of the client was held not to be subject 
to the reporting requirement.”216 In Belgium, the national bar association challenged the 
implementation act in the Belgian Constitutional Court (under Article 6 of the ECHR),217 
but the court referred a question to the European Court of Justice.218 When the case was 
before the ECJ, many European bar and law associations were allowed to weigh in, and 
the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe referred additional question regarding 
the MLD and Article 8 of the ECHR.219Finally in 2007, the ECJ decided that the MLD 
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was compliant with the ECHR, though the court noted that wording regarding the 
lawyer’s responsibility to report can have more than one interpretation.  
On this basis, the Court interpreted MLD Article 6(3) as exempting 
lawyers from the reporting obligation whenever the lawyer acting in 
connection with one of the transactions giving rise to the obligations finds 
himself called upon to give assistance in defending or representing the 
client in court, or to give advice “as to the manner of instituting or 
avoiding judicial proceedings.”220  
In 2008, in light of the ECJ decision, the Belgian court interpreted the phrase 
“advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings,” to mean that an “exemption from the 
reporting obligation could apply to advice given otherwise than in connection with any 
proceedings at all … for example, legal advice given to a client on his personal 
circumstances in relation to a transaction that he is contemplating, or on the best way of 
undertaking it, could be regarded as advice on avoiding proceedings.”221 
National and European bar and law associations activities delayed implementation 
of the third MLD in member states so egregiously that the EU Commission in 2008 even 
threatened “to refer Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, France, and Poland to the ECJ for 
their continuing failure to implement the Third Directive.”222 Ultimately, all EU member 
states implemented the third MLD, ending with Ireland in July 2010.223 Implementation 
acts in member states vary, with the differences mostly related to the issue of lawyers’ 
professional secrecy and the right to a fair trial. For example, in Austria, provisions of the 
third MLD pertaining to lawyers were incorporated into the “Lawyers’ Code,” while in 
the Czech Republic, the MLD implementation act included the broader obligation to 
identify customers in all transactions of more than €1000. In Bulgaria, the MLD was 
extended to companies that provide health insurance, and in Slovakia, the implementation 
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act provides detailed explanations of exceptions to the lawyer’s reporting obligations.224  
For its part, the EU Commission started in 2011 consultations with Council of Bars and 
Law Societies of Europe in order to better clarify the lawyer-related provisions in 
expecting fourth MLD (2012).225    
C. EU TARGETED SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS 
Although the UN and individual states have used various sanctions to enforce 
actions related to other states, the first time sanctions were used against persons was on 
October 15, 1999, when the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) adopted 
Resolution 1267, related to persons and entities affiliated to the Al-Qaida and/or the 
Taliban.226 The resolution: 
require[s] all States to take the following measures in connection with any 
individual or entity associated with Al-Qaida, as designated by the 
Committee: 
• freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or 
economic resources of designated individuals and entities [assets 
freeze], 
• prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by 
designated individuals [travel ban], and  
• prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer from their 
territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using 
their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all 
types, spare parts, and technical advice, assistance, or training 
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related to military activities, to designated individuals and entities 
[arms embargo].227 
 
Later, on December 9, 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and under Article 8(1) 
authorized states to take measures against individuals for freezing funds related to the 
purpose of committing terrorist acts.228 On September 28, 2001, the UN SC adopted 
Resolution 1373, which authorized under provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
UN, that states shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.229The EU and its 
member states responded:  
Although the European Union is not itself bound by the Security Council 
Resolutions from an international law perspective, it has the exclusive 
competence to implement embargoes ordered by United Nations and 
binding on the EU member states (Article 48 para. 2 UN Charter) by 
virtue of Article 60 and 301 TEC.230  
Both the Union and its member states adopted various measures in the implementation of 
these sanctions, mostly out of concerns for human rights. 
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1. The UN SC Resolution 1267 Sanctions Regime 
UN SC Resolution 1267 and all later updates through 2011231 request response of 
states according to the UN list of individuals and entities associated only with Al-Qaida 
and/or the Taliban (Consolidated List). On February 26, 2001, the EU Council adopted 
Common Position (2001/154/CFSP), with the related Council Regulation coming on 
March 6, 2001 (467/2001).232 These binding Council regulations served to “ensure that 
funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services will 
not be made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons, groups and 
entities listed in the Annex.”233 (The EU list is a copy of the regularly updated UN 
Resolution 1267 Consolidated List.)   This document only pertains to persons affiliated 
with al-Qaida.234  
Although, there are no available official data on frozen assets under the UN 
Resolution 1267 for the EU, according to the reports of the UN Analytical Support and 
Sanctions Monitoring Team average amount of the frozen assets, tallied in U.S. dollars,  
under the sanctions regime from 2000–2010 is approximately $84 million annually; the 
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highpoint of $112 million came in 2002. Some 30 to 36 UN member states executed 
these sanctions, presumably several EU members among them.235 
The first human rights critique of the regime established under the Resolution 
1267 was the lack of a de-listing procedure. Six years later, UN SC Resolution 1730 
addressed this issue, by “establish[ing] a focal point within the [UN] Secretariat to ensure 
‘fair and clear’ procedures for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for 
removing them.”236 The EU Commission and especially some of member states—France, 
Greece, and Denmark—were directly involved in development of the de-listing 
procedures as co-sponsors of Resolution 1904.237 Since the establishment of the Focal 
Point some 21 individuals and 43 entities have been de-listed.238 Furthermore, the UN 
SC Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1989 concerning Al-Qaida and 
Associated Individuals and Entities has removed dozens of entries because of new 
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information received from governments or international organizations (though the 
reasons were never published).239 All updates to the Resolution 1267-related list have 
been regularly introduced to the EU member states by Council Regulations.  
Several individuals and entities from the EU challenged their inclusion on the list 
in national and European courts. Two cases are important because they had the most 
influence on the UN regime, as well as on the implementation in member states: the Kadi 
(Qadi) and the Al Barakaat joint case.240 The Courts of First Instance (CFI)241 of the 
European Court of Justice decided in these cases that the states and EU “did not have 
powers to review resolutions of the UN Security Council and that the European human 
rights instruments were not applicable to the case”242 because they [the states and EU] 
are bound by the Article 103 of the UN Charter and Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention.243 Plaintiffs lodged a joint appeal with the ECJ, which in 2008 rejected CFI 
arguments and decided that according to the Treaty on European Union (Article 6), all 
EU “acts must respect fundamental rights and the principles of liberty, democracy and 
respect for human rights.”244 The ECJ concluded that in both cases the accused’s “right 
to defend himself … right to an effective judicial review and … right to property, had 
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been infringed.”245 The EU Council and the EU Commission used a loophole in the ECJ 
decision—stylizing their argument so that the case refers to a specific EU Regulation—
and thus managed not to interfere with the UN SC by re-listing Qadi and Al Barakaat 
after a few months through a new implementing Regulation (1190/2008).246 Still, these 
cases brought about major changes toward a more fair and transparent regime by 
prompting UN SC Resolutions 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009); they also were mentioned in 
several 1267 Committee reports.247  
The judgment of the ECJ in Kadi represents a strong commitment to 
fundamental rights and the (European) rule of law. Advocate General 
Maduro found an appropriate summary in advance: “[M]easures which are 
incompatible with the observance of human rights . . . are not acceptable 
in the Community.” From a global perspective, the ECJ’s insistence on the 
protection of European fundamental rights standards means that political 
bodies are now on the ball. The ECJ made it harder for the UN Security 
Council to adhere to violations of fundamental rights. As such, Kadi 
stands for a new bottom-up process in which a regional court pressures the 
UN Security Council to change its policy towards fundamental rights.248 
After the Qadi and Al-Barakaat cases were concluded, several UN terrorist list-related 
cases at the ECJ and some at the CFI were decided in favor of listed individuals and 
entities.249 
                                                 
 
245 United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 13 April 2011.” 
246 European Commission, Commission Regulations (EC) No 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 
amending for the 101st time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida 
network and the Taliban, (Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 2008), accessed November 6, 2012,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:322:0025:0026:EN:PDF; It is worth to 
mention that Al Barakaat (one individual and 17 related entities—companies) was de-listed for good from 
the UN list in February 2012, and Mr. Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi in October 2012;  United Nations 
Security Council, “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Deletes Entry of Yasin Abdullah 
Ezzedine Qadi from Its List,” United Nations, October 5, 2012, accessed November 6, 2012,  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/sc10785.doc.htm.  
247 Onderco, “Managing the Terrorists: Terrorist Group Blacklisting in Beck’s World,” 37. 
248 Albert Posch, “The Kadi Case: Rethinking the Relationship Between EU Law and 
International Law?,” The Columbia Journal of European Law 1 (2009), accessed October 18, 2012, 
http://www.cjel.net/online/15_2-posch/. 




And additional problem within the sanction regime under the Resolution 1267 is 
that the Resolution was categorical in freezing assets, without allowing even funds for 
necessary basic expenses while cases were in adjudication. Although the EU and its 
member states challenged this hard-line from the beginning, they applied the Resolution 
1267 strictly through the first EU implementation Regulation 467/2001. EU 
implementation Regulation 2580/2001 regarding the UN SC Resolution 1373 in 
December 2001 introduced for the first time exceptions to freezing funds for basic 
expenses, and the same provisions appeared in the update of implementation Regulations 
881 (May 29, 2002) for the Resolution 1267, which finally challenged the UN SC 
Resolution 1267 in a more official way. The UN SC later accepted fact that Resolution 
1267 is imperfect and after few months introduced Resolution 1452 (December 20, 
2002), which allowed exceptions for basic expenses (Article 1).250  Then the EU widened 
its list of excepted expenses by the EU Regulations 561/2003.251 Today, the EU provides 
the most extensive list of basic expenses among the all UN member states—often 
mentioned in a negative context in the Resolution 1267-related UN SC Committee 
reports.252  
2. The UN SC Resolution 1373 Sanctions Regime 
UN SC resolution 1373 (2001) authorizes states to develop their own list of 
individuals and entities associated with terrorism and to freeze their assets. The EU 
responded with Common Position (2001/931/CFSP), which includes the first EU list of 
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individuals and entities associated with terrorism, and the related binding Council 
Regulation (2580/2001).253 Resolution 1373 places the same requirements on members 
states regarding terrorism finance as does Resolution 1267, but it applies all terrorism-
related individuals and entities, not only Al-Qaida- or Taliban-related entities. Resolution 
1373 calls on all UN members to shall refrain from providing any form of support to 
terrorists, to prevent terrorist activities and to inform other states of them, to deny safe 
havens for terrorists, ensure prosecution of terrorists, increase CT cooperation and 
accelerate exchange with other states CT-related intelligence, and to obey international 
law in CT efforts.254  
In order to make a unified approach among member states for the implementation 
of UN SC Resolution 1373, the EU Council applied the EU common definition of 
terrorist offenses (Article 1(3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP), which marked the 
first definition of terrorism in the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which 
was promulgated the same day (December 27, 2001).255  
EU implementation Regulation 2580/2001 was introduced as more human rights 
sensitive, and some of its provisions became the basis for further EU decisions and 
regulations regarding the targeted sanctions, especially for individuals. The European list 
of individuals and entities associated with terrorism—the EU “blacklist—is updated 
every six months, and the responsibilities of EU bodies and member states in listing, 
execution, and de-listing are provided by Regulation 2580/2001 and its regular updates. 
The blacklist is managed by a working group, called the Clearing House, an “informal” 
body that coordinates with representatives from member states and the EU General 
Secretariat and the Commission.256 The Clearing House had problems with funding (a 
corollary to its informal status), continuity of members, and low transparency of 
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listing/de-listing processes. Thus, it was replaced in 2007 by the Working Party on 
implementation of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism (CP 931 Working Party), which has more authorities, 
including the examination and evaluation of cases and drafting final recommendations 
(listing/de-listing) for the EU Council. The Working Party finally brought more 
transparency in the sanction regime.257  
Transparency marked a human rights-related problem in the regime of the UN SC 
Resolution 1373 because of the secrecy of the information that supports the listing of 
individuals or entities on the EU blacklist. Although the EU Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP states that a decision should be taken by a competent authority, that 
authority is not always a judicial authority. Many times, the deciding authority hails from 
intelligence quarters and, thus, the information is secret. The turning point as far as 
transparency in the European CT sanction regime was the court decision in case of the 
People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI). PMOI appeared on the UK’s terrorism-related list in 
2001 and on the first EU blacklist adopted by the Council Decision 2002/334/EC of May 
2, 2002.258 That same year, the PMOI initiated a case with the CFI of the ECJ, seeking of 
the right to be heard and the annulment of Council Decision which listed PMOI as 
associated with terrorism.259 The CFI decided in December 2006 to accept PMOI’s 
arguments about a lack of a fair trial and the evidence against PMOI, and it annulled 
Council Decision 2005/930/EC, which was the latest Council Decision that updated the 
blacklist.260 Still, PMOI remained on the list because of a new Council Decision that is 
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not mentioned in the CFI decision.261 Even after two more new cases before the CFI 
(2007, 2008), PMOI remained on the list because UK did not de-list the group from its 
national blacklist.262  Only after the UK blacklist oversight body decided in 2007 that 
PMOI’s listing was unlawful—after the CFI in 2008 ruled in favor of PMOI to be 
stricken from both the UK and EU blacklists—did the PMOI finally disappear from the 
2009 EU blacklist.263 Since the PMOI case(s) concluded, individuals and entities on the 
EU blacklist have been informed through a “Statement of Reasons” of their listing, 
including reasons, evidence, and the procedures of de-listing, with possibility of using the 
CFI as a remedy.264  
In sum, the EU’s implementation of the sanctions regime according to UN SC 
Resolution 1373 is much better than the regime related to the UN SC Resolution 1267 
and the human rights protection can be considered to be sufficient. 
D. COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES  
International and regional cooperation are indispensable to effective 
counterterrorism, but as Wiegand points out, this desideratum has many challenges. She 
concludes that all CT legal-institutional measures must comply with universal values, 
especially, according to the TEU, with “human rights norms, fundamental freedoms and 
rule of law.”265 Similarly, Seiber-Fohr argues that “the proper legal categorization of 
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anti-terrorism measures will help to give guidance for balancing what seem to be at first 
sight competing interests.”266  
Avoiding conflict between human rights and CT measures is especially difficult 
in data sharing within international CT cooperation, but the EU succeeded in this 
endeavor pretty well. The EU has developed broad international CT cooperation, 
especially after 9/11, and signed many CT-related international agreements—mostly with 
countries related to the roots of the external terrorist threat to the EU or related to 
immigrants communities that support terrorist organizations in their countries. European 
CT international cooperation is most active with countries of Eastern Europe, North 
Africa, Middle East, and South Asia.267 Since 9/11, the EU has succeeded in developing 
a strategic framework in CT partnership with the United States that was institutionalized 
through several important CT-related agreements, formalizing and expanding the old 
network of bilateral agreements.  
Even though the operational CT cooperation has been excellent, negotiations for 
related agreements suffered under different legal approaches, especially as they related to 
the EU approach that agreements must comply sufficiently with human rights 
requirements.268 Although the EU Commission’s approach was not always consistent, 
thanks to pressure from the United States, but the constant oversight by some EU bodies, 
especially the EU Parliament, ensured that the EU-U.S. agreements that involve 
individual data sharing ultimately accorded with the European Convention of Human 
Rights.269.  
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1. U.S. – EU Counterterrorism Cooperation 
Before 9/11 the EU sporadically cooperated with the United States in CT issues, 
on a bilateral basis with member states (France, Spain, UK, Germany). After 9/11, one of 
the priorities of the EU in its international approach to CT issue became increased 
cooperation with the United States.  
During the Joint EU-U.S. Ministerial270 of 20 September 2001, European 
and American leaders made the commitment to “work in partnership in a 
broad coalition to combat the evil of terrorism” and to “vigorously pursue 
cooperation” in several areas: aviation and transportation security; police 
and judicial cooperation; border controls, including visa and document 
security; export control; and law enforcement and exchange of electronic 
data.271 
On September 21, 2001, the European Council introduced the first Plan of Action 
to Combat Terrorism that expressed solidarity as well as strong willingness for 
cooperation with the United States in international terrorism issues.272 The EU member 
states’ law enforcement and intelligence agencies increased terrorism-related data sharing 
with Europol soon after 9/11 as the EU focal point in the European CT international 
cooperation; Europol concluded an operational agreement with the United States on 
December 6, 2001.273 The agreement provides legal support for CT data sharing, 
“including trends and developments in the methods used to commit offences, prevention 
strategies, threat assessments and crime situation reports, [yet] it specifically excludes the 
transmission of personal data” (added by the U.S.-Europol agreement in 2002, updated 
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2006).274 After the United States, as a part of the “war on terror,” executed strikes on 
Taliban forces in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, several EU member states gave direct 
support to the operation through participation in large coalition land forces that were 
deployed later.275 The United States welcomed these measures, “recognizing that that 
they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the United States 
or its interests abroad.”276  
Since 2001, law enforcement, intelligence, judicial, and border security officials 
substantially have increased they operational contacts in connection with a broad set of 
CT-related issues (including liaison officers), and the two partners have also reached 
several important agreements.277 These agreements do not replace existing bilateral 
agreements, but they supplement the agreements and introduce new level of international 
CT approach in several areas, including: law enforcement, judicial, and intelligence 
cooperation (U.S.–Europol Agreements,2001, 2002 and Mutual Legal Assistance [MLA] 
and Extradition Agreements, 2003, 2010; combating terrorist financing (SWIFT 
Agreement, 2010); and strengthening transport security and border control (Passenger 
Name Records [PNR] Agreement, 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2012;  Customs Cooperation 
and Container Security Agreement, 2004).278  
Nevertheless, according to the EU, in connection with the sufficient protection of 
human rights in CT measures, some challenges have been always been present during the 
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negotiations of these agreements. This circumstance has led to periodic tensions over 
such issues as individual data privacy and protection, the death penalty, detainee 
conditions and policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist blacklists, and the 
appropriate balance between border security measures and legitimacy for trade and 
travel.279      
One example of the U.S.-EU human rights-related negotiations is the U.S.- 
Europol Agreement, which was signed just few days after 9/11. It covers the sharing of 
information (threats warnings, crime patterns, risks analyses) but not the exchange of 
personal data (names, addresses, pictures, police criminal records).280 The Supplement to 
the U.S.-EU Agreement was signed on December 20, 2002, more than a year after 
negotiations on the exchange of personal data because the EU data protection 
standards281 consider privacy of personal data as a basic human right.282 Although the 
EU mostly succeeded in negotiating its requirements (especially mutual recognition of 
classification levels and handling with exchanged data),283 some of concerns remained, 
including the lack of U.S. data protection laws regarding non-U.S. citizens and the failure 
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of the U.S. side to provide a list of all agencies that will be consumers of the EU-
provided data—estimated at more than 1500 in federal, state, and local agencies.284  
A second example of the U.S.- EU negotiations with many frictions is the 
development of the Agreement on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 
(MLA) that were signed on June 25, 2003.285  
The extradition agreement incorporated facets of modern practice that 
were absent from older extradition treaties between the United States and 
Member States (e.g., conversion of list treaties to a dual criminality 
approach; streamlining of process for authentication and transmission of 
documents); while the mutual legal assistance agreement (MLA) provided 
a number of provisions absent even from newer mutual legal assistance 
treaties (MLATs) (e.g., tools to identify bank accounts and transactions, 
and to facilitate the establishment of joint investigative teams).286       
The negotiation of these agreements had similar issues to the U.S.–Europol 
agreements, mostly related to EU human rights standards. The biggest problem was the 
death penalty (not permitted in the EU) related to extradition of EU citizens. It was 
solved after the United States “agreed that extradited persons would not face capital 
punishment.”287 Still, signed agreements could not be put into force because the EU 
cannot negotiate international agreements in justice and home affairs matters on behalf of 
the member states (TEU, Article 24 and 38). These agreements only can supplement 
existing the U.S.-EU member states bilateral treaties.288  Thus, the U.S. was forced to 
negotiate new bilateral treaties (Extradition and MLA) with all member states 
individually in order to put the new provisions into force. Although human rights 
standards delayed briefly the negotiations, the whole process was extended until 2009 
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because after negotiations with all 15 EU member states came to the end, the EU 
expanded to 25 member states in 2004, and then to 27 member states in 2007.289 After 
the conclusion of all bilateral extradition and MLA treaties (MLAT), the process of 
exchange of all documents between the United States and the EU took two more years—
until October 28, 2009. Finally, both U.S.–EU Agreements and related bilateral treaties 
entered into force as of February 1, 2010.290 
Rather less has been made in this context of the frictions arising from the different 
approaches to the CT-related security versus human rights.291 The first problems cropped 
up in 2006 and 2007, when newspapers reported the lack of privacy protection in the use 
of SWIFT292  financial records, which was granted the U.S. according to implementation 
of the UN SC Resolution 1373 and the U.S. subpoena to the SWIFT office in New York 
in 2001 (includes financial transfers between EU users).293  Although the U.S. Treasury 
Department issued reports and communicated with the EU Commission in order to bring 
counter arguments, Belgium (where SWIFT is headquartered) and the EU Commission 
found evidence of violations of EU data protection regulations. The EU Parliament 
adopted two related resolutions (2006, 2007) that referred to the problem and called for a 
resolution through an official U.S.-EU agreement.294 In 2008, Belgium reported that new 
U.S. regime of using SWIFT data complied with the EU related regulations. Thereafter, 
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the Agreement on Financial Messaging Data between the EU and the USA (FMDA, also 
known as SWIFT Agreement) was adopted on November 30, 2009, by the EU 
Council.295 The Agreement was designed to be provisional, in effect for only nine 
months. Still, the EU Parliament rejected it just few days after became operational on 
February 1, 2010, and requested new Agreement with more rigorous EU legislation-
related provisions.296 Thus, after few months of turbulent negotiations among the United 
States, the EU Commission, and the EU Parliament), “[t]he European Parliament 
approved the revised agreement on 8 July 2010 and it came into force on 1 August 
2010.”297 Apart from solving all previous problems of access to SWIFT data, the new 
agreement also offers solutions to several other issues regarding future EU international 
CT cooperation agreements and especially compliance of data sharing with EU 
legislation, such as: (a) use of the official EU definition of terrorism (different than the 
U.S. one), (b) verification of all U.S. request with conditions of agreement by Europol, 
(c) the EU oversight over the use of data, (d) judicial compensation for EU citizens, (e) 
regulation of rights to rectification and erasure of data, and (f) regulation of transfer of 
data to the third countries.298  
The second problem related to the security versus human rights dilemma that has 
been generated difficulties in the U.S.-European CT cooperation concerns the EU’s 
approach to implementing UN SC Resolutions 1267 and 1373. Apart from the human 
rights sensitiveness, some differences also exist in designated individuals and entities on 
the U.S. and the EU “blacklists” that have more to do with political issues. The most 
discussed difference is listing of Hezbollah- and Hamas-related charities in Lebanon and 
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associated individuals that appear on the U.S. terrorists’ blacklist but not on the EU 
blacklist because some EU member states argue that it “would be counterproductive to 
managing relations with Lebanon and promoting peace and stability in the region.”299    
Every day approximately 30,000 passengers and more than 3,000 containers from 
the EU arrive in the United States, which explains why both sides made border controls 
and transport security a the priority for U.S.-EU cooperation after 9/11.300 For the most 
part, in aviation security there prevails a very active cooperation, and U.S. and EU 
security standards are similar or at least highly compatible. Still, differing approaches 
have led to periodical disputes arming air marshals (in which matter the U.S. approach 
ultimately prevailed and all were armed after June 2006); human rights sensitivities, 
particularly in Europe, about new body scanners at airports installed after the 2009 
attempt to blow up an airliner on route from Amsterdam to Detroit (resolved by the EU 
Parliament decision on different types of scanners and allowing passengers the option of 
a body search instead x-rays); and U.S. concerns over the EU’s intention to eliminate all 
limitations on liquids in cabin baggage by 2013 (still unresolved).301  
Maritime cargo security cooperation between U.S. and EU is even more seamless, 
codified now under the Customs Cooperation and Container Security Agreement, 2004. 
At least all operations were running smoothly until the recent U.S. request for 100-
percent inspection of sea-borne cargo to American shores, a measure that first appeared 
in the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.302  The proposal remains 
controversial in the United States, and the Obama administration shares the EU’s view of 
the 100-percent scan as costly and time consuming. Amid clamor from U.S. business 
interests as well as major international trading partners, including the EU, “the U.S. 
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Department of Homeland Security notified Congress that it was extending the July 2012 
100-percent scanning deadline by two years.”303       
2. EU-U.S. Legal Dispute and Passenger Name Record Agreement 
The EU and the United States take different approaches in legislating data 
privacy. The EU takes a more restrictive view that covers a wide spectrum of privacy 
rights related to the European Convention on Human Rights and EU human rights law. 
The cornerstone of European data protection is the Data Protection Directive, adopted in 
1995 (95/46/EC). The directive provides detailed guidelines regarding the “processor,”304 
quality of the data, the legitimacy of data processing, special categories of processing, 
information to be given to the data subject, the data subject’s right of access to data, 
exemptions and restrictions, the right to object to the processing of data, the 
confidentiality and security of processing, and the notification of processing to a 
supervisory authority (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party).305  
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In contrast, the United States prefers to impose restrictions only in cases where a 
specific problem appears.306 The United States recognizes a more general right to privacy 
based on an evolution of jurisprudence that, since the latter third of the 20th century, is 
understood to guarantee the positive, if nebulous, right to privacy.307 Although the term 
“privacy” has various meanings in U.S. law (freedom from undue surveillance or 
interference by law enforcement, the right to an abortion, a person’s choice in the use of 
his name for marketing, etc.), “a person has to scour a number of authorities—the 
“patchwork quilt”—to determine how any element of his or her data is protected in the 
United States.”308  This lack of comprehensive or unitary privacy protections, coupled 
with the obsolescence of some U.S. laws in light of contemporary technology, prompted 
the EU Commission to conclude that the U.S. protection of European data is inadequate 
and incompatible with the Data Protection Directive.309 
Transfers of personal data from a [EU] Member State to a third country 
with an adequate level of protection are authorized. However, they may 
not be made to a third country which does not ensure this level of 
protection, except in the cases of the derogations listed.310 
Ultimately, this divergent legislative approach has been at the root of all recent 
disputes related to the various EU-U.S. data exchange agreements.  
The case of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement presents an apt a case 
study of these disputes because it is the most complex, not least because it has been 
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challenged for many years by various EU and U.S. institutions. The United States enacted 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), which, among other 
provisions, requires all airline companies operating to, from, or across the United States 
to provide U.S. Customs with electronic access to their PNR data.311 Failure to do so 
could result in fines for the offending airline or even the loss of U.S. landing rights. To 
remain on the right side of the ATSA, European companies at the beginning mostly 
choose to comply with the U.S. act—which means that they violate the EU Data 
Protection Directive.312 Although data collected and exchanged in relation with public or 
state security and defense form an exception to the provisions of the Data Protection 
Directive, this exception does not cover PNR data collected for commercial use. In order 
to resolve European airlines’ dilemma of which regulations to follow, the Commission 
negotiated with the United States the postponement of the entry into force of the ATSA 
requirements for the EU, and started initial talks on a bilateral EU-U.S. PNR 
agreement.313  
After two years of negotiations, on December 16, 2003, the Commission 
presented to the European Council and European Parliament provisions of future bilateral 
agreement and outlined that the U.S. had agreed to:  
a. limit its PNR requests to a closed list of thirty-four items,  
b. delete all categories of sensitive data,  
c. use the data only to prevent and combat terrorism and related crimes, 
(4) retain the PNR data for no more than three and a half years,  
d. receive and handle representations from E.U. data protection 
authorities on behalf of E.U. citizens who have outstanding complaints 
with the Department of Homeland Security,  
e. participate with an E.U. team led by the Commission in an annual joint 
review.314 
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The Commission explained that data exchange would include a multilateral 
approach developed with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It would 
be organized as a “push” system of data transfers, which means that airline companies 
would transfer data to the United States, in contrast to the “pull” system that was then in 
use—and that the United States clearly preferred—which allowed U.S. officials access to 
the airline companies’ databases.315 Awkwardly, the Council supported the agreement, 
while the Parliament rejected it as drafted and sought adjustments to accord with the Data 
Protection Decision and TEU.316 Furthermore, the Parliament “refer[red] the matter to 
the Court [ECJ] for review of the legality of the projected international agreement.”317  
The dispute between the Council and the Parliament about the PNR agreement 
culminated after April 28, 2004, when the Council asked the Parliament to give an urgent 
opinion on the conclusion of the agreement by May 5, 2004, but the Parliament rejected 
this request with opinion that is necessary to wait for the ECJ’s opinion.318 On May 14, 
2004, the Commission announced its decision that U.S. Customs has an adequate level of 
PNR protection for air passengers under the EU Data Protection Directive. This finding 
fulfilled the prerequisite for an agreement, under Article 25[6] of the Data Protection 
Directive, which led to the Council Decision on May 17, 2004, that introduced the 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the 
Processing and Transfer of PNR (Passenger Name Records) Data.319  
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Although the majority of the provisions announced in the Commission’s earlier 
communication were included, the agreement did not provide for the multilateral 
approach through ICAO or, more importantly, timing timetable for changing from the 
current “pull” system to a “push” system of data transfer. The European Parliament 
responded on July 27, 2004, with an application to the ECJ for the annulment of both the 
Commission’s decision that U.S. Customs can ensure an adequate level of data protection 
(ECJ case C-318/04) and the Council Decision 2004/496/EC related to the EU-U.S. PNR 
Agreement (ECJ case C-317/04).320 The European Court of Justice joined the cases and 
on May 30, 2006, annulled both PNR related documents.321 However, the ECJ did not 
address fundamental rights infringements claims, and judgment was purely based on an 
inadequacy of both documents within the scope of Data Protection Decision. The ECJ 
postponed its decision until September 30, 2006, which gave some time to the EU and the 
United States to address the shortcomings in the data-sharing regime. The EU and the 
United States renegotiated the provisions of the PNR agreement quickly, and on October 
19, 2006, they signed a new, temporary PNR agreement.322  
Other than changing the legal basis from the Data Protection Directive to the TEU 
(Article 24 and 38), however, the temporary PNR agreement did not realize most of the 
EU Parliament’s concerns, and the agreement met with a firestorm of criticism from even 
broader European quarters. First, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, as a 
negotiator for the U.S. side, succeeded in inserting language that required the automatic 
application of future changes in the U.S. legislation, including U.S. Executive Orders, 
“meaning that the U.S. [side] will be able to decide on how the respective data will be 
processed and by whom.”323 Members of the EU Parliament criticized some changes in 
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the current PNR data exchange regime, such as: unspecified timing of changing “pull” 
system to a “push” system of data transfer; facilitation of transfer of PNR data to new and 
unspecified U.S. agencies responsible for combating terrorism; new reasons for PNR data 
exchange, like “fight[ing] infectious disease and other risks,” which additionally 
expanded the number of PNR data users.324  
The Commission tried to answer critics by characterizing the agreement as a 
matter of absolute urgency for the continuity of CT-related current PNR regime, which 
has resulted many times in crucial information in terrorism and organized crime-related 
investigations in the United States as well as in the Europe.325 Furthermore, the Council 
Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA on October 16, 2006, to sign the temporary agreement on 
behalf of the European Union, gave EU member states a control mechanism and authority 
to intervene should they find infringements of individual privacy.326 
The competent authorities in Member States may exercise their existing 
powers to suspend data flows to DHS in order to protect individuals with 
regard to the processing of their personal data if they consider that the 
processing of PNR data is not in accordance with the standards of 
protection provided for in the Undertakings given by DHS, or where a 
competent United States authority has determined that DHS is in breach of 
those standards, until compliance with those standards is assured.327 
Before the temporary PNR agreement expired, the EU and the United States inked 
a new, revised agreement in July 2007. This agreement consists of three documents: the 
EU-U.S. PNR Agreement; a letter of assurances from DHS on methods of data 
protection; and a confirmation letter from the EU that it accepts DHS’s assurances as 
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adequate.328  The revised agreement also incorporates some of the EU Parliament’s 
proposals for stronger protection of individual privacy, such as: the United States 
agreeing that the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of Information Act may 
apply to EU citizens; compulsory and standardized DHS notice to air companies 
regarding PNR data use; a process of redress available for the public; and most centrally, 
the adoption of the “push” system of data transfer.329 On the other hand, the revised 
agreement weakens some earlier provisions, like extending the data retention period from 
three and a half to 15 years; requiring air companies to send data at least 72 hours before 
a flight departs; including data on additional baggage and frequent flyer membership; and 
in exceptional circumstances collecting individual data that may include information on: 
race, ethnicity, political opinion, religion, philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, 
health, and even sex life.330            
Of course, although the 2007 PNR agreement was signed and put in practice, it 
was, as a legal and political matter, still provisional, pending the European Parliament’s 
approval. Traditionally skeptical of EU-U.S. cooperation in CT and human rights issues, 
the European Parliament decided in May 2010 to postpone its vote on the 2007 PNR 
agreement and asked the Commission to develop a “global external PNR strategy,” which 
should be implemented in all current PNR agreements (U.S. [2007], Australia [2008], and 
Canada [2005]), as well as applying to all future PNR agreements.331  The European 
Commission issued the proposal on the global approach to transfers of PNR data to third 
countries on September 21, 2010. The European Parliament finally accepted strategy on 
November 11, 2010, and then gave recommendations for the opening of negotiations on 
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current PNR agreements between the European Union and Australia, Canada and the 
United States.332  
PNR data should be used exclusively to combat terrorism and other 
serious transnational crimes, passengers should be given clear information 
about the exchange of their PNR data and have the right to effective 
administrative and judicial redress, and that a decision to deny a passenger 
the right to board an airplane must not be based solely on the automated 
processing of PNR data … the categories of PNR data exchanged should 
be as limited as possible and that PNR data should be retained no longer 
than absolutely necessary.333 
The Obama Administration started negotiations in December 2010 largely 
because the European Parliament was unlikely to approve the current agreement, but in 
May 2011, the U.S. Congress introduced a resolution (H.Res. 255) that passed in the 
Senate (S.Res. 174) supporting the existing 2007 PNR agreement and asking DHS to 
avoid any modification that could degrade its effectiveness. A few days later, the media 
published a draft of the renegotiated 2007 PNR agreement that enhanced the protection of 
individual privacy in PNR data exchange regime through larger restrictions on the 
retention of PNR data, greater legal certainty and clarity on individual rights to redress, 
and restrictions on denial of boarding because of automatic processing. Negotiations were 
concluded, and in November 2011 a new draft PNR agreement was presented. This latest 
draft did not differ much from the leaked version except for two important changes, one 
“limiting the use of PNR data specifically to terrorist or other serious transnational crimes 
that could result in three years or more in prison; and [the second,] varying the retention 
time depending on the type of crime under investigation (data would still be retained 
ultimately for 15 years for terrorist investigations, but only 10 years for investigations 
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into other types of crimes).”334 Although some EU member states (Germany, Austria) 
and some MEPs criticized provisions on data retention and redress as insufficient, the 
European Parliament gave its consents on April 19, 2012, the EU Council on April 26, 
2012, adopted the decision to accept the new EU-U.S. PNR agreement, which finally 
came into force on June 1, 2012.335 
The main aspects of the new PNR agreement with the U.S. are: 
• a strict purpose limitation, the use of PNR data being limited to the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences or transnational crime; 
• a legally binding commitment from the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security to inform the Member States and EU 
authorities of any EU relevant intelligence leads flowing from the 
analysis of these PNR data; 
• a robust data protection regime with strong data security and 
integrity requirements; 
• rights of access, rectification and erasure and the possibility to 
obtain administrative and judicial redress; 
• a limited usage of PNR data for a period of ten years for 
transnational crime and 15 years for terrorism. After 6 months 
personally identifiable information of PNR data will be masked out 
and after five years PNR data will be moved to a dormant database 
with additional controls.336 
The case of EU-U.S. PNR agreement shows how difficult is in counterterrorism 
find adequate balance in “security vs. liberty” dilemma, yet the EU and the U.S. 
succeeded and set standards for others, like in the case of the agreements with Australia 
and Canada. Furthermore, as Timothy Kirkhope, the British representative in the 
European Parliament, pointed out in June 2011, the EU-U.S. PNR agreement “has proven 
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incredibly effective at combating serious crime and terrorism.”337 Many officials on both 
sides of the Atlantic agree. For example, Belgium reported that 95 percent of all drug 
seizures in 2009 resulted from PNR data exchange. Similarly, the UK reported that PNR 
helped foil a number of potential terrorist incidents, and it was especially important in the 
investigation of David Headley, the terrorist convicted in the United States and involved 
in the Mumbai attacks in India in 2008. In all in the UK, the  “use of PNR through the e-
borders scheme has led to the refusal of entry and detention of many people, including 57 
for murder, 175 for rape/sexual assault, 25 for kidnapping, 441 for fraud, 397 for drugs 
offences and 920 for violence.338 Indeed, the United States reported that PNR data has 
been used successfully more than 3,000 times in 2008 and 2009, including in the 
investigation of many of the most notable terrorist plots in the country.339 The U.S. 
analyses of information provided by PNR and SWIFT data exchange regimes have 
produced thousands of quality leads for investigations and several thwarted plots in the 
EU and the United States. As Kirkhope concludes, “This is not a one-sided transfer of 
data across the Atlantic, but a partnership.” 340 
E. CONCLUSION 
The majority of experts agree that effective counterterrorism measures are usually 
in some kind of conflict with human rights, either directly contravening laws  or 
conventions of human rights or indirectly infringing through other implementation acts. 
Nevertheless, EU counterterrorism measures must comply with universal values, 
especially, according to the Treaty of EU, with “human rights norms, fundamental 
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freedoms, and [the] rule of law.”341 As such, it is fair to say that the European CT legal-
institutional framework contributes significantly to the fight against terrorism “through 
strengthening of cooperation between Member States,” international CT cooperation, and 
the promotion of “sufficient” human rights protection.342  
The term “sufficient” is very apt in the human rights-related examination of the 
European Arrest Warrant, EU Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Directives, EU 
targeted sanctions related to UN Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1373, and the 
important CT partnership with the U.S. The analysis of the EAW shows that national 
implementation acts can undermine the human rights basis of an EU measure—and that 
the Union can and will take steps to address such discrepancies. The Union-wide EAW 
represents an innovative instrument that has given judicial authorities a very efficient 
mechanism against criminal offenders, including terrorists. Although the Money 
Laundering Directives have been fully—and effectively—implemented in all member 
states, the MLDs met with many challenges, especially from national and international 
lawyer associations. Still, all EU courts decisions ruled that the MLD complies with the 
Treaty of the EU and the European Convention of Human Rights. Similarly, the EU 
approach to challenging the UN SC terrorism-related targeted sanctions regimes on the 
basis of human rights protection provides an even more positive example that human 
rights should and can figure prominently, if not preeminently, in the security-versus-
liberty calculus. Finally, despite deep-seated philosophical and practical differences 
between the EU and the United States, recent CT strategic meetings, joint statements, and 
other CT-related arrangements with mutually accepted solutions definitely reaffirmed the 
trans-Atlantic partnership and give examples for others.343  
On the other hand, as the analysis of EAW and MLD shows, there are still some 
unclear provisions that can be interpreted in different ways that often lead in violation of 
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European Convention of Human Rights. Also the EU Commission is eager (or sometimes 
forced) to check the human rights sensitivities of member states’ implementation acts; 
indeed, the Commission often has reacted against them through consultations, additional 
directives, or even referring the matter to ECJ. However, this dynamic may be explained 
as lessons learned about the oversight of the EU Commission CT solutions by the EU 
Parliament.  
Thus, this chapter shows one very positive side of the European CT management 
because CT measures have been closely monitored by the EU member states, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and particularly European 
Parliament, many times demanding the development of additional clarifying directives or 
amendments to make them more fair and lawful. As such, in the universal dilemma of 
counterterrorism measures, security versus human rights, the European Union’s CT 
measures come down as much as possible on a side of human rights while not endangers 
effectiveness of CT operations. Certainly, the EU’s desire “to prevent and combat 
terrorism and transnational crime effectively as a means of protecting their [member 
states] respective democratic societies and common values” is sufficiently supported 





IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU COUNTERTERRORISM 
APPROACH 
“Remarkably little has been done to assess to what degree EU counter-terrorism 
policies have achieved the stated objectives,” MEPs said in a non-binding text, which 
calls on the EU Commission to make use of its powers under the Lisbon Treaty and to 
produce a “full and detailed” evaluation of such policies and the extent to which they are 
subject to democratic scrutiny.344  Although scholars agree that the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of CT is, at best, an inexact science, this chapter provides a quantitative 
analyses of several CT indicators and is a logical extension of a qualitative analyses in 
the chapters leading up to this one in order to take full picture of the European CT. 
Governments and CT agencies usually justify their CT measures in terms of 
trends of terrorist attacks and victims versus funds committed to CT measures to arrive at 
a basic measure of cost-effectiveness. On the other hand, many experts suggest that this 
rational approach, based entirely on direct indicators, is insufficient and other indicators 
should be taken into account, including the number of arrested, prosecuted, and convicted 
terrorists and public fear of terrorism. Ultimately, quantitative analyses of terrorist 
activities (attacks, victims), law enforcement and judicial responses (arrests and court 
proceedings), as well as public terrorist threat perception show the positive effects of the 
European CT legal-institutional framework in the period after the first EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy was adopted, since the end of 2005.  
In this analysis of the terrorist activities, law enforcement, and judicial responses, 
the period since 2006 is important for two reasons. First, the development of the 
European CT legal-institutional framework culminated in 2005, when the CT strategy 
was adopted and most of the previously introduced measures finally were implemented 
by the EU member states. Second, Europol reports since 2005 have become much richer 
and more accurate as a result of the new European CT reporting instruments and Europol 
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authorities regarding CT-related data exchange with member states.345 In other words, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of CT in the EU is finally possible, based 
on the authorities and requirements of the legal-institutional framework under analysis—
and, indeed, to advance a methodology for such an analysis, as this chapter undertakes to 
do.346 
All told, this chapter demonstrates that the European CT framework is effective 
on the basis of several indicators: the decreasing trends in failed, foiled, and successful 
terrorist attacks; the decreasing number of victims per terrorism attack as well as much 
lower overall number of victims in the EU than in the rest of the world; the significant 
initial increase and then decreasing trend of the number of suspects arrested on terrorist 
related charges; the increasing rate of arrests that lead to trials for terrorism; the modest 
average sentence after trials for terrorism following the lower incidence of terrorist 
activities; low level public fear of terrorism; and public support of European CT 
measures. Thus, this analysis explores all available terrorism-related numeric indicators 
that form an “impact” component of the CT effectiveness, and terrorism-related EU 
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public opinion as an “outcome” component of the CT effectiveness to give a much fuller 
picture of the European CT legal-institutional framework as an experienced CT 
approach.347  
A.   TRENDS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE EU (2006–2011) 
“In order to see if a particular policy is effective, the level of terrorist activity 
[should] be plotted over time, and then examined to see if the fluctuations bear any 
relationship to the introduction and operation of the policy.”348 Trends of terrorist 
activities represent an aggregate measure that must account for incidents and victims. 
Thus, the present analysis begins with a review of material comparable to the typical 
cost-effectiveness analysis, including the number of failed, foiled, and successful terrorist 
attacks as well as the number of victims of these attacks in EU member states for the 
period 2006–2011. (The most recent data currently available is from 2011.)349   
1. Failed, Foiled, and Successful Attacks 
By this measure, the European CT measures are positive in the sense of 
decreasing trends of violence. (See Figure 1.) On the one hand, the total number of failed, 
foiled, and successful terrorist attacks in the EU for the period 2006–2011 is very high—
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some 2,411 such attacks in these years (Table 1). More importantly, though the trend has 
been steadily negative since 2007. This trend, as a direct indicator, supports the 
conclusion that European CT measures have had wide positive effects.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Number of failed, foiled and successful terrorist attacks in the EU 2006-2011 
(After:350) 
On the other hand, Table 3 shows that this positive trend simply tracks the decreasing 
number of separatist terrorist activities over the years—which is significant because 
almost all the designated terrorist attacks in the EU in this period were related to 
separatists. According to Europol, the vast majority of EU terrorist activities between 
2006 and 2011 owed to separatist terrorist organizations in France (Basque and Corsican 
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separatists), Spain (ETA), and the UK (Continuity IRA, Real IRA).351  As such, more 
than 90 percent of all failed, foiled, and successful terrorist attacks in the EU in the period 







































































































































2006 472 444 1 424 30 1 0 16 
2007 583 548 4 532 21 1 1 24 
2008 515 484 0 397 28 0 5 85 
2009 418 390 1 361 40 4 2 10 
2010 249 214 3 180 25 0 1 40 
2011 174 158 0 110 37 1 0 26 
Table 3.   Number of failed, foiled and successful terrorist attacks in the EU 2006-
2011 (After:352) 
The IRA first decreased and then stopped its offensive activities in 2005,353 
mostly because of some UK government decisions that were executed in Northern Ireland 
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according to the Good Friday Agreement (1998).354 At the same time, European CT 
measures implemented shortly after 9/11—notably the European Arrest Warrant and the 
money laundering directives, including measures to combat terrorist financing and 
freezing terrorist assets—put pressure on IRA operations and increased costs for terrorist 
activities.355 Indeed, the Republic of Ireland ratified the EAW just three weeks before the 
IRA’s announcement in July 2005 that it would renounce violence; in light of earlier 
negative experiences with IRA-related extradition between Ireland and UK, the EAW 
was a meaningful element in the IRA decision. Conversely, ETA in Spain did not end its 
hostile activities in 2011356 following any political negotiations; it was more the result of 
intensified counterterrorist operations executed simultaneously from Spain and France. 
These joint counter-ETA efforts have been reinforced with several European CT 
measures, including cross-border investigations and prosecutions supported by Europol 
and Eurojust, the EAW extradition regime, MLD CT-related measures, intelligence 
cooperation through SitCen, new EU infrastructure and ports protection standards, and 
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technical arrangements on the possession and handling with explosives and CBRN 
materials.357  
Cooperation among European law enforcement agencies was important to 
counterterrorism successes. France and Spain continued to cooperate 
effectively against ETA. Belgian courts convicted individuals connected 
to the 2003 Madrid bombings and several countries, including France, 
Spain and Italy, broke up terrorist networks facilitating travel by foreign 
fighters to Iraq.358 
After separatist terrorism, left-wing terrorism is next-most significant European 
CT issue. During the period 2006–2011, the number of left-wing terrorist attacks has 
hovered at 20–40 per year on the European level, but some countries like Italy and 
Greece have recently witnessed a resurgence of such violence. In 2006, left-wing 
terrorism accounted for only 6 percent of terrorist activities reported in Europe, but with 
the decline in separatist activities in the subsequent years, left-wing terrorism came to 
represent some 25 percent of the terrorist activity in Europe. As such, violence from the 
left has become a CT priority in many European countries, most urgently in Greece.  
Other types of terrorist activities in the EU like religious-inspired, right-wing, and 
single-issue terrorism have not posted many activities, but they all remain important CT 
issues, especially right-wing and Islamist terrorism.359 Since 2007, Europol has 
repeatedly pointed out that the threat of violent right-wing extremism has re-emerged in 
Europe and should not be underestimated. “Although violent acts perpetrated by right-
wing extremists and terrorists may appear sporadic and situational, right-wing activities 
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are organized and trans-national.”360 Therefore, some European police forces pay special 
attention to the investigation and prosecution of the far-right threat and even have 
established specialized units to fight against it. Otherwise, however, member states’ 
approaches have been inconsistent and so far joint European strategy against far-right 
extremism does not exist.361   
Cases of violent right-wing extremism have tended to be dismissed, with 
most deemed outliers, not representative of a growing trend or threat. 
However, a recent stream of right-wing extremist attacks in Norway, 
Germany and Italy has demonstrated that the extreme right should be a 
prime subject of inquiry over the coming years. Although there is less risk 
of a large-scale attack from the extreme right, recent years have borne 
witness to new forms of public disorder instigated and propagated by the 
British extreme right, often resulting in lower-level group or individual 
acts of violence.362 
Although since 9/11, Islamist terrorism has been the main impetus for the development of 
the EU counterterrorism legal-institutional framework, Europol’s own figures show that 
Islamic and similar religiously inspired terrorism represents very few terrorist incidents in 
the EU—only 0.3 percent of all terrorist attacks. Still, in light of the mass casualties from 
9/11 attack in the United States as well as the implications of the Madrid and London 
bombings and the persistent fear that Muslims in Europe are radicalizing, Islamist 
terrorism remains one of the main issues for the EU counterterrorism. Some information 
on several failed and foiled terrorist attacks have been published, especially those related 
to Islamist terrorism and intended to cause mass casualties and major material damage. 
Examples include the attempt to bomb trains in Koblenz, Germany, in 2006; a UK-based 
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plot against 10 U.S.-bound airliners in 2006; a plot to bomb facilities in Odense, 
Denmark in 2006; the plot to bomb London city targets and Glasgow airport in 2007; the 
plot to attack Barcelona and other European metro systems in 2008, and a plot with links 
to Europe and Pakistan for Mumbai-style attacks on Britain, France and Germany in 
2010.363  
Although the majority of operational counterterrorism activities have been 
executed by member states, European officials argue that no state is able to tackle 
terrorism alone and that European CT measures have been very important in recent 
positive results of combating terrorism in Europe.364 At the bottom line, it seems clear 
that “European countries continued to improve their capabilities to counter the terrorist 
threat, foiled several significant terrorist plots, and continued to prosecute and jail 
terrorist suspects.”365  In other words, in terms of terrorist incidents, the EU’s CT 
framework is successful—and effective. 
2. Terrorism Victims 
The second part of this trends analysis is the number of terrorism victims per 
incident (fatalities and injured). According to the Global Terrorism database for the 
period 2006–2011 there are no discernible trends in Europe for fatalities, but  the number 
of terrorism-related injuries has declined since 2008 (Table 4). 366  
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http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2010/11/201011121042791250.html. 
364 EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Report on EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, 
(Brussels, Belgium: EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, 2011), accessed July 11, 2012, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st17/st17594-re01.en11.pdf;  Gijs de Vries, “The Fight 
Against Terrorism - Five Years After 9/11”; Rob Wainwright, “Foreword by the Europol Director,” in TE-
SAT 2012 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague, Netherlands: European Police Office – 
EUROPOL, 2012), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf. 
365 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports 
on Terrorism 2007,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2008, accessed August 13, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2007/103707.htm. 
366 Although, Europol does not report on statistics of fatalities and injured in terrorist attacks, the 
data of terrorist victims in the EU for the period 2006-2011 is from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism 










World 8606 14523 3.5 5.9 
EU 4 26 0.06 0.4 
2007 
World 11456 19639 4.2 7.2 
EU 78    (6)16 23 1.5    (0.1)367 0.4 
2008 
World 5216 11389 2.4 5.2 
EU 1 48 0.01 0.5 
2009 
World 4594 12465 2.6 7.1 
EU 10    (3)16 45 0.1    (0.03)16 0.5 
2010 
World 3821 8564 2.1 4.6 
EU 4 30 0.05 0.4 
2011 
World 8100 14452 1.6 2.9 
EU 3 16 0.03 0.18 
Table 4.   Fatalities and injured in terrorist attacks 2006–2011 (After:368) 
Most importantly, the number of victims per terrorism attack in the EU nowadays is 
much lower than in the rest of the world—which was not the case in period from 1970s 
until 1990s.369  
The average number of fatalities per incident per year in the EU is 0.29, which is 
considerable lower than the global average of 2.73 fatalities per terrorist attack (Table 
4).370 It is true that the world totals may be skewed, as GTD classifies the majority of 
                                                 
 
367 Data without incidents describes in footnote 15.  
368 START, “Global Terrorism Database 2006-2011.”  
369 START, “Global Terrorism Database,” Data for period 1970-1999. 
370 For this analysis number of terrorist attacks in EU was taken from Global Terrorism Database 




incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorism, even though most observers today would 
count such incidents as acts of or in insurgency. Nevertheless, even without Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the global average still comes to 2.15 fatalities per attack, which is still very 
high—more than seven times higher than in the EU.371  
Moreover, if one counts only those incidents that fit the EU definition of terrorism 
in the GTD data, then the real number of fatalities per attack in the EU is even lower—
0.05 deaths per terrorist incident. In the event, GTD counted three incidents in 2007 and 
2009 with large numbers of victims and defined as terrorist acts, with the predictable 
effect on totals for these years. None of the EU member states where the attacks 
happened—Greece, Finland, and the Netherlands—treated them as terrorism, however, 
based on their rather narrower definition of the term, along the lines of the EU 
definition.372  
The GTD data on injuries per terrorism attack in the EU during the period 2006–
2010 reveals a fairly constant rate, an average number per year with 0.44 per attack. Then 
it decreases precipitously to 0.18 injured per attack in 2011 (Table 2). The simple average 
for the research period is 0.31 injured per attack, which, as with fatalities, is much lower 
than the global average of 5.9 (4.0 without the numbers from Iraq and Afghanistan).  
Granted that one of the most important goals of any terrorist attack is to inflict 
massive casualties on the target population, the low number of terrorism victims in the 
EU—both in absolute terms and on a per-incident basis—supports the conclusion that the 
European CT framework has had positive effects. The lack of a clear trend in these 
numbers makes it difficult to correlate a given year’s numbers with particular CT 
measures, but the overall positive effect is indisputable. 
                                                 
 
371 Author’s research, START, “Global Terrorism Database,” Data for period 2006-2011. 
372 During July 2007 forest fires all over Greece have caused 63 deaths (At the beginning of 
investigation Greece characterized these fires as pyro-terrorism, but later did not find evidence for that and 
did not reported to Europol). On November 7, 2007 in Tuusula High-School (Finland) one student killed 
eight people and later on himself (Finish police concluded that act was not terrorism). On May 1, 2009 in 
Apledorn (Netherland) car smashed into the crowds celebrating the queen's day and killed seven people. 
According the investigation, it was the attack on the Dutch Royal family, but not an act of terrorism. 




B. ARRESTED, PROSECUTED, AND CONVICTED TERRORISTS IN THE 
EU (2006–2011) 
Little of the analytical literature uses statistics of arrested, prosecuted, and 
convicted terrorists as a measurement of CT effectiveness. Of the few that do look at this 
indicator, the majority argue that higher numbers mean successful policy, more or less as 
a matter of direct correlation. The real story of these numbers is more complex, however, 
as this section establishes.  
It is true that after the implementation of new CT measures, especially those that 
include new law enforcement authorities or describe new offences, the number of 
arrested and later prosecuted and convicted terrorists should increase if the CT effects are 
positive. In this immediate aftermath period, then, higher numbers of arrests, 
prosecutions, and convictions certainly suggest successful CT measures. After some time, 
however, if law enforcement and judicial CT measures are successfully institutionalized 
and combined with preventive, social-oriented, or counter-radicalization measures, the 
trends of arrested, prosecuted, and convicted terrorists should decline amid the sustained 






Figure 2.  Number of arrested and tried suspects for terrorism in the EU 2006-2011 
(After:373) 
1. Arrest and Trial 
The data on trials of terrorists is rather less reflective of changes in CT policy or 
practice because national judicial systems usually have special terrorism-related tracks. 
These special structures may limit the number of cases heard or at least proceed at a pace 
that has more to do with the particular rhythm of these prosecutions than with any factors 
outside the courtroom. Thus, as Figure 2 shows, the rates of trial are more or less constant 
                                                 
 
373 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2012, (excluded UK statistical 
data); UK Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent 
legislation: arrests, outcomes and stop and searches, 2009,2010,2011, (London, UK: UK Home Office, 
2012), accessed July 12,2012, http://data.gov.uk/dataset/statistics-terrorism-arrests-outcomes (Statistical 
data for England, Wales, and Scotland 2006-2011. Data for 2006 and 2007 are for financial years April-
March); Police Service of Northern IrelandPolice Recorded Security Situation Statistics, (Belfast, UK: 
Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2012), accessed July 12, 2012, 
http://www.psni.police.uk/security_situation_statistics_-_by_district_and_area__april_2012_-
_may_2012_published_15.6.12.pdf; UK data represent the number of charged after police arrests in order 
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and provide little relevant insight into the effectiveness of the measures that got the 
defendants to the docks in the first place. The number of suspects arrested on terrorist 
related charges, quite apart from what happens to these suspects after arrest, therefore is a 
key indicator, even if the correlation is not as direct as the number of terrorist attacks or 
related victims.  
 The total number of suspects arrested for terrorism in the EU for the period 
2006–2011 is 4.230. The numbers show a significant increase from 2006 to 2007, most 
likely a reflection of the many new CT measures passed in 2005 (Figure 2).374   
 
 
Figure 3.  Number of arrested suspects for terrorism in the EU 2006-2011 (After:375) 
                                                 
 
374 It is most likely influenced by many new arrest and investigation authorities according to a 
new measures like European Arrest Warrant, Anti-money Laundering Directives, Freezing of Terrorist 
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Figure 3 shows that number of arrests related to separatist terrorism in the EU, 
determines the total trend for the period 2006–2009. These numbers come 
overwhelmingly from France, Spain, and the UK. Separatist terrorism-related arrests 
represented 83 percent of all terrorism arrests in 2006, declining to 63 percent in 2011. 
The actual decline is even more marked, as much of the 2011 total is related to incidents 
by Corsican separatists, who are “the harmless ones in Europe” because they traditionally 
target only properties. Of the other categories of terrorism, only arrests for religious 
terrorism376 have significant representation. Although religious terrorism, especially the 
Islamist variant, remains a significant threat to and in Europe, the number of arrests 
shows a declining trend.377 This drop, too, could be connected to EU efforts to addressing 
the factors contributing to violent radicalization after 2005, including: broadcast media, 
Internet, education, youth engagement, encouraging European integration, inter-cultural 
and religious dialogue, experts sharing network, monitoring and collection of data, and 
active relationships with non-EU states.378    
The total number of suspects arrested for terrorism shows a significant increase in 
2006, following the new CT measures. Then after 2007, the data shows a steadily 
decreasing tend. If the simplistic correlation between arrest numbers and effectiveness is 
true, then this decline in arrests would mean that European CT became less and less 
effective as time progressed. It seems rather more likely, however, that other European 
CT measures produced positive synergistic effects, especially preventive anti-
                                                                                                                                                 
 
375 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2012, (excluded UK statistical 
data); UK Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, (Statistical data for 
England, Wales, and Scotland 2006-2011. Data for 2006 and 2007 are for financial years April-March); 
Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics. UK data represent the 
number of charged after police arrests in order to provide a more accurate comparison with data of judicial 
arrests in the other EU Member States. 
376 Until 2010 European Union officially used term “Islamic Terrorism.” 
377 The United Kingdom does not differentiate according to ideology the individuals it arrests for 
terrorism-related crime. 
378 Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation, “Addressing the factors contributing to violent 





radicalization measures and the decreasing of separatist terrorism by curtailing IRA and 
ETA violence.   
2. Conviction and Punishment 
The rate of arrests that lead to trials for terrorism has risen from 35 percent in 
2006 to 64 percent in 2011.379 While the overall number of arrests has decreased, this 
significant increase of cases that lead to trials for terrorism may owe to progress in the 
quality of CT-related pre-arrest investigations, as well as established information and 
evidence transfer regimes. Investigations include more countries that seriously evaluate 
accusations before any arrest or evidence sharing, so the majority of these arrests later 
lead to trials for terrorism.380 Furthermore, in a time of decline for serious terrorist 
activities in Europe, an increasing rate of arrests that lead to trials for terrorism could be 
connected to a new CT judicial measures that allow refocusing on “easier” cases. 
According to Europol, the recent years have seen increased arrests in less dangerous 
cases like “membership of a terrorist organization, propaganda, possession of arms and 
explosives, and the dispatch of fighters to conflict”381 that are easier to investigate—than, 
say, more serious terrorist activities like preparation, attempted, or completed of attacks. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend can be also connected with emerged activities 
since 2006 in cross-border CT support of EU Joint Investigation Teams, Eurojust judicial 
                                                 
 
379 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2012, (excluded UK statistical 
data); UK Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, (Statistical data for 
England, Wales, and Scotland 2006-2011. Data for 2006 and 2007 are for financial years April-March); 
Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics. UK data represent the 
number of charged after police arrests in order to provide a more accurate comparison with data of judicial 
arrests in the other EU Member States. 
380 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports 
on Terrorism 2011,” U.S. Department of State, July 31, 2012, accessed August 13, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195543.htm; Michèle Coninsx, “Criminalization & Prosecution of 
Terrorist Offences,” Eurojust, Counter-Terrorism Team Special meeting, Strasbourg, April 20, 2011, 
accessed August 13, 2012,  www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2011/docs/eurojust.ppt; U.S. 
Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 
2007.” 




direct CT support, SitCen role, as well as increased authorities of the European CT-
related agencies.382  
 
 
Figure 4.  Concluded court proceedings involving terrorist charges in the EU          
2006–2011 (After:383) 
EU member states’ courts concluded 869 proceedings for terrorism-related 
offences the period 2006–2011, trying 2,098 individuals (Figure 4.). The total number of 
verdicts was 2,222 because some individuals were tried for more than one offence. Some 
1677 or 76 percent of verdicts were convictions. Annual data shows a rapidly increasing 
trend for conviction in the year 2006–2007, following the establishment of the 
comprehensive CT framework. To be sure, the number of individuals tried and convicted 
                                                 
 
382 EUROPOL, “History”; Eurojust, “Background: History of Eurojust”; Mai’a K. Davis Cross,  
“EU Intelligence Sharing & The Joint Situation Centre: A Glass Half-Full,” European Union Studies 
Association, 2011, accessed  August 15, 2012, http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/3a_cross.pdf. 
383 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2012; UK Home Office, 
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for terrorism does not follow exactly the same patterns as arrests because of the length of 
court proceedings, which in the EU can take up to three years.384   Even so, however, the 
overall trend after 2007 is declining, which is most likely caused by other European CT 
measures that produced positive synergy effects, as well as because total terrorism-related 
activities declined. Moreover, because the number of court proceedings in France, Spain, 
and the UK represents more than 70 percent of the EU terrorism-related proceedings, the 
declining trend also may be explained by the decrease in IRA and ETA activities. 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Average penalty in the EU 8 12 10 5 7 6 
Table 5.   Average penalty in the EU (years in prison) for terrorism-related cases 
2006–2011 (After:385) 
In terrorism-related case proceedings in EU member states, the average penalty 
for terrorism in the period 2006–2011 is eight years in prison (Table 5). This average 
sentence is modest in compared with some other regions in the world, but this point also 
is indicative of the lower incidence of terrorist activities.386  
The European Union has a general mission to promote a criminal justice 
approach to the fight against terrorism, in contrast to the paradigm of a 
“global war on terrorism.” Terrorists have to be investigated, prosecuted 
and convicted wherever possible according to the normal rules of criminal 
                                                 
 
384  For example: 21 terrorists for attack in Madrid 2004, convicted in 2007; members of the 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) were convicted in France in 2007 for providing support to 
2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2011.” 
385 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2012. 
386 Related to the largest terrorist attacks in the EU (Madrid, London), the penalties were much 
higher and like in case of Madrid bombings it range for multiply charges even up to 43.000 years 
EUROPOL, “In October [2007], Spain's National Court returned guilty verdicts on 21 of 29 individuals 
suspected of involvement in the 2003 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 people and wounded hundreds 
of others, and handed down sentences ranging from three years to almost 43,000 years in prison. (although 
the maximum time they can serve under Spanish law is 40 years).”; U.S. Department of State, Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007”; EUROPOL, EU Terrorism 




law. The Madrid bombers never feature in Al Qaeda propaganda like the 
inmates of Guantánamo. Why? Because they stood a fair trial and were 
convicted for their criminal acts.387 
Still, the average terrorism conviction rate in the EU in period 2006–2011 was 73 
percent, which, especially in light of the EU’s human rights sensitiveness, even in 
terrorism-related cases, may be a meaningful contributing factor to the decreasing trend 
of terrorism activities in EU.388 
C. PUBLIC FEAR OF TERRORISM IN THE EU 
 A year before the tragic events of 2001 in the United States, the 
Eurobarometer389 introduced a section that includes fear of terrorism as one of the “things 
that could have disastrous effects for the world.”390 In the 2001 report, compiled after the 
9/11 attacks, 86 percent of Europeans said that they personally feared terrorism (12 
percentage points more than one year earlier); 79 percent feared the proliferation of 
nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction (+17 points), and 64 
percent feared a world war (+19 points).391 It merits mention here that the exact question 
was just repeated from the survey from 2000, which asked “whether people are afraid of 
10 things that could have disastrous effects for the world,” and provided a list.392 Thus, 
                                                 
 
387 Gilles de Kerchove, Speech delivered by the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator at the Opening 
Ceremony for the 10th Anniversary of Eurojust, The Hague, 28 February 2012, accessed August 16, 2012, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1459936/speech-10th-an-eurojust-ver2.pdf. 
388 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2012. 
389 “Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (“Standard Eurobarometer surveys”) have been 
conducted each Spring and Autumn since Autumn 1973. From Autumn 2001, they have been conducted on 
behalf of the Directorate-General Press and Communication (Opinion Polls) of the European Commission. 
An identical set of questions was asked of representative samples of the population aged fifteen years and 
over in each Member State. The regular sample in standard Eurobarometer surveys is 1000 people per 
country except in Luxembourg (600) and in the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in 
Northern Ireland). The figures shown in this report for each of the Member States are weighted by sex, age, 
region and size of locality.”; European Commission: Eurobarometer, Report Number 56, (Brussels, 
Belgium: European Commission, April 2002), accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb56/eb56_en.pdf.   
390 European Commission: Eurobarometer, Report Number 56, 12.    





the 2001 percentage likely reflects the aftermath of 9/11 to some generalized extent, but it 
really did not measure the fear of terrorism in Europe because it did not refer to a terrorist 
attack in the EU; it was more globally oriented.  
Year after, the Europeans’ sense of the threat of terrorism as “one of 10 things 
that could have disastrous effects for the world” decreased to 82 percent, even while 91 
percent of Europeans said that the EU should give priority to the fight against terrorism, 
and 54 percent saw European CT efforts as effective.393 Country-by-country analysis of 
these results showed there were not many differences in the level of fear of terrorism 
among EU member states, even for those with previous experience of terrorism on their 
soil, including the countries with major terrorist activities like France, Spain, Germany, 
Italy, and the UK.   Again, these results suggest a generalized unease about terrorism 
somewhere, rather than a specific measure of Europeans’ sense of personal security 
within the EU. 
In 2003, the Eurobarometer changed its approach, and instead of more globally 
oriented issues, it introduced question: “What do you think are the two most important 
issues facing [your country] at the moment?”394 Thus, according to the new question, fear 
of terrorism resonated with only 12 percent of those interviewed (Figure 5), though 89 
percent of Europeans agreed that EU must continue to place priority on the fight against 
terrorism.395 Additionally, in this new public opinion survey approach, the differences 
among the member states were larger. The sense of both the threat of terrorism and the 
                                                 
 
393 European Commission: Eurobarometer, Report Number 58 (Brussels, Belgium: European 
Commission, March 2003), 13, 66-68, accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb58/eb58_en.pdf.  
394 European Commission: Eurobarometer, Eurobarometer 59, Public Opinion in the European 
Union (Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, July 2003), B.5, accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_final_en.pdf.  
395 European Commission: Eurobarometer, Eurobarometer 60, Public Opinion in the European 





priority of counterterrorism measures w was clearest in Spain and the UK, and also 
scored significant numbers in Ireland, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Denmark.396  
  
 
Figure 5.  Public opinion on terrorism as one of the two most important issues facing EU 
member state (After:397) 
With less specific prompting in the survey language, Europeans seem largely 
untroubled by the threat of terrorism. Indeed, according to the results of Eurobarometer 
surveys from 2003 to 2012, terrorism has never been an important issue for European 
citizens (Figure 5). In 2003, only 12 percent of Europeans identified terrorism as a major 
concern. The fear rate, as it were, peaked at 16 percent after the Madrid bombings, and 
then hit 15 percent after the London bombings, dropping in 2012 to vanishing negligible 
two percent.  
                                                 
 
396 Ibid. 
397  European Commission: Eurobarometer, “Public Opinion: Standard Eurobarometer,” Autumn 
Number 60 (2003), 62 (2004), 64 (2005), 66 (2006), 68 (2007), 70 (2008), 72 (2009), 74 (2010), 76 (2011), 
Spring Number 77 (2012), European Commission,  accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.  
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One might argue that these results were influenced by the many EU member 
states that have never experienced terrorist attacks. However, a comparison of the EU-
wide survey results and results from the three EU member states that traditionally have 
the most terrorist attacks per year (France, Spain, and the UK),398 shows no meaningful 
differences, particularly in terms of the direction of the trend (Figure 5). Even in France, 
Spain, and the UK, terrorism have been seen only occasionally as a very important 
national issue, and these moments of increasing citizens’ concerns of terrorism 
correspondent with major attacks. Following the March 2004 attacks in Madrid, public 
fear of terrorism slightly increased on European level. It increased more in France, Spain, 
and the UK; as a product of Spanish citizens’ fear of future terrorist attacks, in the 
autumn 2004 increased to its historical maximum of 59 percent.399 Spanish respondents 
remained concerned thereafter, but terrorism as important issue has steadily declined to 
46 percent in spring 2005 and 31 percent in autumn 2005.400  
Interestingly, after the London bombings in July 2005, the survey results for 2006 
registered only a slightly higher concern about terrorism among European—15 percent, 
just 1 percent higher than in 2005 (Figure 5). Surprisingly, at the same time, fear of 
terrorism increased significantly only in few countries, notably in those where terrorist 
attacks or threats were current issues. In the UK, the responses rose from 14 percent to 34 
percent; in the Netherlands, from 22 percent to 40 percent; and in Denmark, from 10 
percent to 32 percent.401 Even these localized upticks did not change the overall trend 
among France, Spain, and the UK, which saw a steady decline in the perception of fear as 
the Madrid bombing faded into memory. In fact, these three states have experienced such 
                                                 
 
398 According to the EUROPOL reports more than 90 percent of all failed, foiled and successful 
terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006-2011 period have been related to separatism (ethno-nationalism) and 
happened in Spanish, France, and the UK; see Chapter III, Section A. 
399 Even during the ETA bombing campaigns, like in 2003, the Spanish citizens’ concerns of 
terrorism like one of the two most important national issues never exceeded 51 percent. European 
Commission, “Public Opinion: Standard Eurobarometer, Autumn Wave 64 (2005),” accessed November 3, 
2012, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htm.    





a drop in public fear of terrorism that in 2011, for the first time, they posted an even 
lower percentage than the EU-wide level of less than 2 percent (Figure 5).402  
The decline in the fear of terrorism began at a time when many new CT measures 
were introduced (2006);403 it also correlates with the decreasing trend of failed, foiled, 
and successful terrorist attacks in EU, all of which indicates a positive impact of the 
European CT framework.404 
Furthermore, since 2003 the Eurobarometer occasionally introduced additional 
and more direct research into European CT efforts, including questions on: comparing the 
European and national counterterrorism decision-making; three actions that the EU 
should follow in order of priority; European CT approach in comparison with the U.S.; 
the two most important issues that EU citizens personally face at the moment; and the 
two most important issues facing the European Union at the moment. The results are 
illuminating. Support for a European approach to CT decision-making instead of 
national-level decision-making has been overwhelming (81 percent) and constant in the 
period 2003–2012.405 The greatest support for joint European CT traditionally has come 
from Germany (92 percent). The lowest support for EU CT comes, interestingly, from 
Spain (64 percent) and the UK (68 percent), but these numbers still indicate a two-thirds 
majority in favor of region (EU) decision-making.  
As far as the three actions that the EU should follow in priority, during the period 
2003–2007, every fourth European citizen responded that counterterrorism should be one 
                                                 
 
402 While concerns about terrorism did increase in 2010—in Germany (19 percent, +17), the UK 
(12 percent, +6) and in France (6 percent, +4)—it was mainly the result of “widespread media coverage of 
the terrorist threats against these countries.” Thus, although in some countries, concerns about terrorism ran 
higher than in others and temporarily reacted to major terrorist attacks, the fear of terrorism around the 
Europe in last decade has declined to almost nothing. European Commission, “Public Opinion: Standard 
Eurobarometer, Autumn Wave 74 (2010),” accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm.  
403 See data in Chapter II, Section C. 
404 See data in Chapter IV, Section A. 
405 European Commission, “Public Opinion: Standard Eurobarometer,” Autumn Number 60 
(2003), 62 (2004), 64 (2005), 66 (2006), 68 (2007), 70 (2008), 72 (2009), 74 (2010), 76 (2011), Spring 




of the EU’s main tasks. After that, the question was reformulated, and CT was removed 
as an answer option for this question.406 Views on which actions or policy areas the EU 
should focus differ between old member states and the new ones that joined after 2004. 
Citizens of old member states favor CT as EU priority issue more than respondents in 
new member states.407  Old and new Europe alike agreed that the EU’s approach to CT 
surpassed the American version. Public opinion at the EU level as well as separate results 
for Spain, France and the UK, characterized the European CT approach as better, with an 
average 59-percent approval for the EU approach in compare with average of 11 percent 
for the U.S. approach.408  
In 2010 a question was introduced on the two most important issues that a citizen 
personally faces at the moment, and terrorism was mentioned in only 2 percent of the 
responses.409 This answer was similar in all EU member states, including Spain, France 
and the UK; later this rate decreased to 1 percent in 2011 and 2012. In the same period, 
the surveys covered the same question of the two most important issues, but now 
regarding the European Union. For all 27 EU member states, terrorism was mentioned by 
15 percent of interviewed citizens; surprisingly in Spain, France, and the UK, only 13 
percent of citizens identified terrorism as a top-two issue for the EU.410 This result may 
related to the media campaign, previously noted, on the eminent terrorist threat because 
in later years, the opinion on terrorism as an important issue for the community dropped 
to 7 percent (2011), and then to 5 percent (2012). Furthermore, during 2011, 
Eurobarometer organized a special survey on European internal security issues, and of 
the five challenges set out by the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, terrorism was 
                                                 
 
406 European Commission, “Public Opinion: Standard Eurobarometer,” Autumn Number 60 
(2003), 62 (2004), 64 (2005), 66 (2006), 68 (2007). 
407 Fighting terrorism as priority policy area: average ratio is 29 percent in old member states 
versus19 percent in new member states. 
408 Average results for the period 2003–2007. European Commission, “Public Opinion: Standard 
Eurobarometer,” Autumn Number 60 (2003), 62 (2004), 64 (2005), 66 (2006), 68 (2007). 
409 European Commission, “Public Opinion: Standard Eurobarometer,” Autumn Number 74 





identified as the most important.411 Also, regarding the five challenges, 60 percent of the 
respondents see the European as well as national CT efforts as positive and sufficient in 
the fight against terrorism; only 32 percent see CT efforts as insufficient.412 Through an 
open question on the key challenges to the security of the EU, and of their country, the 
interviewed citizens identified the economic and financial crises, but terrorism threat 
remains highly pressing. As a challenge to European security, terrorism was identified by 
33 percent of respondents; and as a challenge to national security, by 25 percent.        
With the possible exceptions of several months following the 9/11 attacks, 
terrorism actually never became a prime concern for EU citizens in any of 
the EU MS [member states], except for Spain and UK [recently after 
Madrid and London terrorist attacks]… [A] Majority of EU citizens sees 
EU efforts to address the terrorist threat more positively than EU actions 
in any other area of concern… [And] Eurobarometer data indicates that 
ever since 9/11, there is widespread consensus among European citizens in 
all EU MS that decisions regarding the fight against terrorism should be 
made jointly within the European Union.413  
Ultimately, most of the surveys’ results over the years since 9/11 are in 
conformity with trends of failed, foiled, and successful terrorist attacks in the EU, which, 
in turn, is probably the largest influence on European citizens’ dwindling fear of 
terrorism. Indeed, EU citizens see European as well as national CT efforts as positive and 
sufficient in the fight against terrorism.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Eleven years after September 11, European Union is safer from terrorism, and its 
citizens do not count terrorism as an important threat. Thus, how much the European CT 
framework has contributed to these positive trends in terrorist activities and public 
                                                 
 
411 The Internal Security Strategy in Action sets out five challenges to the internal security of the 
EU: terrorism, organized crime, natural and man-made disasters, cybercrime, and security of EU borders. 
Europa: Press Release RAPID, “Eurobarometer survey on internal security: the economic crisis and 
terrorism top the agenda,” MEMO/11/829, November 25, 2011, accessed November 3, 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-829_en.htm?locale=en. 
412 Europa: Press Release RAPID, “Eurobarometer survey on internal security.”  




opinion is a matter of ongoing policy significance. Although the ultimate ambition of 
CT—to put an end to terrorist incidents and casualties—is hard to achieve, the significant 
decrease of terrorist activities and the low number of terrorism victims in recent years in 
the European Union is a respectable result. The total number of failed, foiled, and 
successful terrorist attacks in the EU has been steadily declining since 2007, and the 
number of victims per terrorism attack in the EU is more than seven times lower than 
global rate and almost vanishing in comparison with Europe in the past few decades.  
Similarly, the trends of arrested and later prosecuted and convicted terrorists first 
increased rapidly following the major activities following the introduction of the 
European CT measures, and then decreased most likely amid the synergy of results of 
police, judicial, and prevention CT measures—and quite possibly of decreasing terrorist 
activities. Furthermore, analysis of European public opinion related to terrorism shows 
that the decline in the fear of terrorism correlates with the increasing numbers of CT 
measures and the decreasing trend of failed, foiled, and successful terrorist attacks in EU. 
Perhaps most conclusively, overall, terrorism in the post-9/11 period has not been the 
most important issue for EU citizens. Taken together, these trends speak to the positive 





V. THE COSTS OF EU COUNTERTERRORISM FRAMEWORK  
Although European CT measures have broad effects on public life, rule of law, 
and EU decision-making, they also have an impact on budget and therefore, the European 
Parliament requested a costs-analysis of European CT measures implemented since 
9/11. Serious analysis that can connect precise expenditures with European CT legal-
institutional measures are impossible at this juncture, but this chapter represents a first 
attempt.  
Until recently, little research had been done regarding the costs of the European 
CT legal-institutional framework. For this reason, the Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament (LIBE Committee) requested in 
January 2011 to be informed about CT expenditures before July 2011.414 The European 
Commission responded quickly, and presented its first report on the Estimated Costs of 
EU Counterterrorism Measures in May 2011. This independent study415 informs much of 
this chapter as it is the only comprehensive document on European CT costs so far.416  
The research into European CT costs was challenged even before it got started 
because of a dispute about which part of security-related costs may be attributed to CT. 
As noted, it is hard to distinguish clearly among the hundreds of European CT measures, 
how many of them are directly or 100-percent CT, or “CT-important,” or “CT-related,” 
or which were introduced under the faster process of adopting CT measures, but then 
barely used or put to purposes other than for CT. Furthermore, as majority of measures 
                                                 
 
414 European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “The EU 
Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges, Working Document 1,” (Brussels, 




415 Study was done by PricewaterhouseCoopers EU Services Support Team. 
416 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, by Wim Wensink, 
Michael van de Velde, and Lianne Boer, (Brussels, Belgium: European Parliament, May 2011), accessed 





are not 100-percent CT, many of them also are not used by single user; they are dual- or 
even multiple-user measures. Similarly, the majority of CT measures are taken in 
member states and used, as well, in combating such other important national issues as 
organized crime.  
The research project arrived at a solution in the form of a broad approach to 
definition of European CT measures that included assessments of:  
• Costs within the EU budget: for EU CT policy programs, for EU 
agencies (Europol and Eurojust), for the EU funds that were made 
available [in any level] for counterterrorism programs and projects, 
large IT-systems and EU bodies.417 
• Costs borne by the private sector: aviation sector, maritime sector, 
telecom companies and Internet service providers, and the 
financial sector.418 
However, the research does not include “all costs made for external aid, ranging 
from development aid to deployment of EU police forces outside the EU territory… [and] 
the costs of counterterrorism measures borne by EU member states.”419 Furthermore, 
outcomes of estimated CT-related costs of private sector produced as only general 
remarks and rough estimations, and therefore the results have not presented as a part of a 
total European CT-related cost, and also not included in this chapter. 
Obtaining precise CT expenditures posed many challenges that resulted with 
lacking of relevant data and made the results of study more imprecise, including the lack 
of financial provisions in most CT framework documents, the lack of specified CT 
expenditures in EU institutions or within EU security-related programs, as well as a less 
cooperative private sector. Thus, according to authors of study, the outcomes of the 
                                                 
 
417 Costs within the EU budget includes expenditures of EU CT policy programs (Protection of 
civilians, transport, infrastructures and energy, and CBRN programs), EU Agencies (Europol, Eurojust), 
CT related funding (Framework Programs, Annual grants), Large IT-systems (SIS, VIS), General 
Secretariat of the Council (CTC, SitCen).; European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism 
Measures, 35. 
418 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 14. 




Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures should be regarded as an “educated 
guess.”420 The results are as follows: 
1. The major component of the overall costs of counterterrorism 
measures of the EU consists of the EU’s funding programs. 
2. Costs incurred by the private sector are much harder to establish: 
information on the costs related to CT measures incurred by the 
private sector is fragmented and scarcely available and the actors 
themselves are mostly unaware of the costs resulting from specific 
(EU) CT measures. 
3. Total estimated EU spending on CT measures [without private 
sector] between 2002 and 2009 increased from approximately €5.7 
million in 2002 to around €93.5 million in 2009.421 
These are valuable findings of general trends in the European CT-related 
expenditures that may be used for limited conclusions about CT cost-effectiveness, for 
example in cases of Europol and Eurojust CT expenditures.    
Related to the total estimated EU spending on CT measures without private 
sector, the European Commission followed the LIBE Committee specification on what 
exactly has to be included and provided report through four main areas: (1) Costs of EU 
                                                 
 
420 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 9. 




CT policy programs;422 (2) Costs of CT activities of EU agencies;423 (3) Costs of funding 
of CT programs and projects;424 (4) Costs of contribution to CT by large IT-systems.425  
Although the EU has population of approximately 500 million and, as 
community, forms the largest world’s economy, its total annual budget is relatively small 
in comparison to the total member states’ budgets, about 1 percent of the combined sum. 
The EU budget has risen each year since the Union was established, though over the last 
six years, this growth slowed to only about 2 percent per year. Regarding to CT part of 
the EU budget in 2011 allocated €126,497 million.426 Amid the so-called euro-crisis, 
however, necessary fiscal savings among member states and a decrease of the EU budget 
in the next few years well may precipitate cuts to some CT expenditures funded under 
EU budget Heading 3a, “Freedom, Security and Justice.”  Although this item currently 
represents only 0.67 percent of total EU expenditures at the end of Financial Framework 
2007–2013,427 it had enjoyed the steepest upward trend among all EU budget headings 
                                                 
 
422 This area “deals with EU CT policy programs that are related to or relevant for the fight 
against terrorism on a European level. As such, it deals with the following policies: civil protection, 
transport-, energy- and infrastructure protection, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
(CBRN) protection. European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 19. 
423 “With regard to the EU agencies, the CT costs incurred by Europol and Eurojust are assessed 
and included. Excluded from the scope of EU agencies are CEPOL and FRONTEX.” European Parliament, 
Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 19. 
424 “The EU’s funding structure, relevant to this report, consists of two separate strands. One are 
the Framework Programs. Funding from these sources is completely dedicated to “research-related EU-
activities”. The time span of this study covers the end of Framework Program 5 (FP5; 1998-2002), the 
whole of Framework Program 6 (FP6; 2003-2006) and half of Framework Program 7 (FP7; 2007-2010(3)). 
The second strand is the annual grants, awarded by DG Home and DG Justice. The time span of this report 
covers the following programs: OISIN II, Falcone and Grotius (all 2001-2002), AGIS (2003-2006) and 
Security and Safeguarding Liberties (2007-2010). European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU 
Counterterrorism Measures, 20. 
425 Large IT systems that contributed to European CT are: “the Schengen Information System, or 
SIS, consists of a database containing information on people and objects, submitted by the Member States 
of the Schengen area, [and] the Visa Information System, or VIS, consists of a central database containing 
personal data (for the visa process) of third country nationals entering the Schengen area.”; European 
Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 20. 
426 European Commission, EU Budget 2011: Financial Report, (Luxembourg: European 
Commission, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012), accessed November 8,2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2011/fin_report/fin_report_11_en.pdf.  
427 Heading 3a: Freedom, security and justice did not exist in the Financial Framework 2000-





(Table 6). CT-related Heading 3a expenditure increased at a rate of almost 100 percent 
per annum in the years after the European CT strategy was adopted and when many new 
CT measures were introduced (2007–2009). 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EU implemented 
budget (€ million)428 112,377 113,070 112,107 120,490 126,497 129,088 137,924 
“3a” implemented 
budget (€ million) 200 380 667 667 829 836 928 
“3a” percentage of 
the total EU 
implemented budget 
0.17 0.33 0.59 0.55 0.65 0.65 0.67 
Table 6.   Comparison of EU expenditure and CT-related Heading 3a expenditure 
(After:429) 
The total amount of estimated costs of European CT funded from EU budget 
(Heading 3a) increased from €5.7 million in 2002 to €93.5 million in 2009, which 
represents only 0.08 percent of total EU spending. Analyzing the whole research period, 
the total cost of the European CT framework for the period 2001–2010 is estimated at 
€374.31 million or only 0.03 percent of the total EU implemented budget at the same 
time.430 Thus, CT expenditures since 2001 increased for almost three times, which still 
looks small, but positive results of European CT framework that analyses in previous 
chapters lead as to conclusion that CT expenditure is sufficient.  
 
 
                                                 
 
428 Figure for 2012 is EU voted budget and for 2013 is EU draft budget. 
429 Although the report Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures in its findings of 
some CT expenditures does not cover 2001 or some does not cover 2010, the trends of annual costs of 
European CT measures were presented in period 2002-2009 as period which has the most detailed data. 
European Commission, EU Budget 2011: Financial Report. 
430 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 19-21; European 





Figure 6.  Total estimated costs of European CT measures in € millions 2002–2009 
(After:431) 
These budget figures are negligible in comparison to the EU’s largest strategic CT 
partner, the United States. Detailed comparison of the CT-related costs between the U.S. 
and the EU is impossible because of different CT systems—notably the highly 
decentralized U.S. system of law enforcement, with more than 1500 institutions on the 
federal, state and local levels. On the other hand, the budget of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) generally covers similar areas as the “Citizenship, freedom, 
security and justice” line within EU budget, so some plain parallels can be made. The 
total EU estimated CT outlays since 9/11 of €374.31 million looks pitiful in comparison 
with the U.S. “non-defense”432 homeland security spending in the same period of $471.1 
billion.433 The U.S. “non-defense” DHS budget for 2010 alone was $32.6 billion; 
                                                 
 
431 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 19-21. 
432 Part of DHS annual budget is funded through the Pentagon's "base" budget. 
433 “Funding for homeland security has risen from $16 billion in FY2001 to $71.6 billion 
requested for FY2012. Adjusted for inflation, the United States has spent $635.9 billion on homeland 
security since FY2001. Of this $163.8 billion has been funded within the Pentagon’s annual budget. The 
remaining $472.1 billion has been funded through other federal agencies.”; National Priorities Project: 
Bringing the Federal Budget Home, “U.S. Security Spending Since 9/11,” May 26, 2011, accessed 
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compared to the implemented EU budget in 2010 for “citizenship, freedom, security and 
justice” that is more than twenty times less, about $1.7 billion.434 
A. EUROPEAN CT POLICY PROGRAMS  
The category of CT policy programs includes costs of programs in civil 
protection, transport protection, energy protection, and infrastructure protection as one 
category of costs, and CBRN programs as another category particularly because of the 
large expenditures specific to CBRN. A large increase in expenditures for policy 
programs is related to the European CT strategy and the provisions of the “protect” and 
“response” pillars. The total expenditure of CT-related policy programs since 9/11 is 12.7 
percent of all CT costs, but in 2005 and 2006 that rate rose to more than 20 percent 
(Table 7) because after the Madrid and London bombings, the EU greatly increased the 
budgets for EU action programs in the field of civil and transport protection. It also 
introduced new action programs for the security of energy installations and infrastructure, 
and CBRN programs.435 In 2005–2006, the EU introduced many measures, but in the 
end, only 20 percent was really executed as CT. Furthermore, as many EU expenditures 
were related to time-limited research and technological development programs, and to 
support the establishment high-readiness civil protection modules or teams,436 the 
protection expenditures gradually decrease by almost 25 percent after 2008 (Table 7). For 
example, after full implementation of new measures the costs of CT-related programs in 
transport security vanished in 2010.437  
 
 
                                                 
 
434 The implemented EU budget in 2010 for headline 3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice 
is €1306 million. It is converted in dollars using ration 1 US dollar = 0.7867 euros.; European Commission, 
EU Budget 2011: Financial Report, 96-97. 
435 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 37-43. 
436 See EU initiatives under protect and response pillar, Chapter II, Section C. 




 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Protection 0.28  0.92  1.55   1.84   1.91   2.65  3.77   3.37   3.03  
CBRN - - - 3.55  5.87  6.67   4.46  7.36  10.78  
Total 0.28  0.92 1.55 5.39 7.78 9.32 8.23 10.73 13.81 
Percentage 
of EU CT 4.94 6.57 8.70 20.69 21.85 12.11 10.39 11.47 -
438 
Table 7.   Estimated costs of EU CT policy programs in € millions (After:439) 
Regarding to inclusion of the CBRN protection in 2005 as an important CT 
measure in fight against international terrorism (particularly Al-Qaeda associated 
groups); it led to increasing of CT-related expenditures CBRN safety as well as security 
programs. Since the beginning CT expenditure associated to CBRN safety and security 
assessed to be 50 percent of total costs of CBRN-related initiatives. Other CBRN actions 
like public health preparatory actions and proliferation of WMD assessed to be CT-
related as of 20 percent. Nevertheless, as many CBRN safety and security measures has 
implemented and costs decreased, the “main contributor to the rise in [total CT-related 
CBRN] spending, from 2008/2009, is the “public health” program…, [which] is 
specifically aimed at threats to public health resulting from CBRN-terrorism.”440 
B. CT ACTIVITIES OF EU AGENCIES  
Total estimated European expenditure on CT measures executed by Europol and 
Eurojust between 2002 and 2010 increased from €4.95 million in 2002 to €7.36 million in 
2010 (Table 8), yet “the CT spending by Europol appears significantly larger than those 
incurred by Eurojust.”441  
                                                 
 
438 The total estimated cost of the European CT measures for 2010 are incomplete, and therefore 
is not possible to make an accurate analysis. 
439 European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 19. 
440 Ibid. 49. 




 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Europol 54.6 57.6 61.0 65.8 66.0 70.4 66.4 68.0 80.1 
Eurojust 0.6 1.6 1.5 4.2 4.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 7.8 
Europol 
CT costs 4.9  5.2  5.5  5.9  5.9  6.3  6.0  6.1  7.2  
Eurojust 
CT costs 0.05  0.09  0.11  0.18  0.25   0.18  0.15  0.09  0.16  
Total 
CT costs 4.95 5.29 5.61 6.08 6.15 6.48 6.15 6.19 7.36 
Table 8.   Estimated costs of CT activities of EU agencies in € millions (After:442) 
First, that is because the Europol structure is larger than Eurojust, which is also 
visible in their annual budgets, as of almost 100 times larger Europol budget in 2002, and 
11 times larger in 2010 (Table 5). Second, CT-related cross-border Europol’s activities 
are more frequent and costly, which resulted in stable CT-related budget representation of 
nine percent annually, and Eurojust CT-related cases represents small portion of overall 
Eurojust activities and representation gradually decreased from eight percent in 2002 to 
only two percent in 2010 (Table 5).443 That is because of linear increasing of Eurojust 
cases over the years since its establishment and in the same time CT-related cases remain 
relatively small or even decreased following overall trend of decreasing terrorist 
activities, arrests and prosecutions of suspects for terrorism in European Union after 
2007. Although, in area of CT is almost impossible to apply a cost-effectiveness analysis 
because of incalculable cost of a human life, but in the case of relatively small 
                                                 
 
442 Regarding to the EU agencies, this analysis included only Europol and Eurojust as two 
agencies that has direct tasks related to CT and have actively participated in execution of many European 
CT measures. Some agencies have occasionally dealt with CT as their secondary task, and therefore they 
are excluded from the scope of this study, such as: European Police College, FRONTEX, European Data 
Protection Supervisor, and European Fundamental Rights Agency. Furthermore, the European CTC’s 
office was excluded from this study because consist of seconded staff finance by their member state. 
European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 20. 




representation in the European CT-related costs of the Europol and Eurojust, a conclusion 
should be that their contribution is cost-effective.  
C. FUNDING OF CT PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS  
The estimated CT-related cost of EU’s funding programs and projects of two 
separate areas, the Framework Programs (FP 5, 6 and 7)444 and EU’s annual grants 
awarded by DG’s Home and Justice. Since 9/11, the EU’s funding of CT programs and 
projects represents the most of total European CT-related costs, as of €235.08 million or 
67.4 percent. Nevertheless, this part of European CT cost started with humble €0.35 
million in 2001 than following 9/11 rapidly increased for almost 20 times in 2003 on 
€7.72 and later again increased in years after the European CT strategy, especially in 
2007 when increased for more than three times on €56.36 million (Table 9.). That is 
mostly related to the increase of the annual grants because the European CT-related 
framework programs remained the same in every year of program, which is usually four 
years.  
  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Grants 0.32  0.36  0.38  1.94  6.59  9.53  40.75  45.21  54.10  
Framework 
programs 0.03  0.03  7.34  7.34  7.34  7.34  15.61  15.61  15.61  
Total 0.35 0.39 7.72 9.28 13.93 16.87 56.36 60.82 69.71 
Table 9.   Estimated costs of funding of CT programs and projects in € millions 
(From:445) 
One of important objectives in European framework programs is to promote 
research activities in support of all EU policies, but looking the CT-related funding data, 
                                                 
 
444. “The time span of this study covers the end of Framework Program 5 (FP5; 1998-2002) 
Framework Program 6 (FP6; 2003- 2006) and Framework Program 7 (FP7; 2007-2009).”; European 
Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 57.   




this objective is not applied proportionally to other EU policies. Although, since 2003 
and the Sixth FP many CT-related projects were funded because of the new introduced 
CT Framework Decision in 2002, and later within the Seventh FP in 2007 followed the 
European CT strategy, still the CT portion of the overall spending under FP remained 
very modest. The CT-related funding under Sixth FP was in total €29.36 million or just 
0.17 percentage of €17.5 billion as total FP budget, and then through Seventh FP slightly 
increased on €62.44 million in nominal value, but decreased on only 0.12 percent of the 
overall FP budget of €53.2 billion. Thus, even with relatively small amount of total funds 
the EU supported significantly some of important CT activities and researches over the 
years since 9/11.446 
The European CT-related annual grants funded programs related the area of 
freedom, security and justice, and included activities that “range from annual seminars to 
the design of computer systems to share information on criminal records across the 
EU.”447 Although the September 11 triggered increasing of the European CT framework, 
it first time influence on the introduction of CT-related grants two years after with 
amount of €0.38 million in 2003 and mostly covered CT-related training and cooperation 
projects in area of justice. Following the Madrid bombings, CT annual grants slowly 
increased on €1.94 million in 2004 and mostly spent on program related to victims of 
terrorist acts (more than 50 percent) and different programs of prevention, preparedness, 
consequences management, and JITs. Nevertheless, after the London bombing and 
especially after introduction the European CT strategy and updated CT Action Plan, the 
                                                 
 
446 Sixth FP has funded CT projects such as: land and sea integrated monitoring for European 
security, development of sensors applicable to detection of various of explosives, research of subject matter 
experts in CT-related issues, and coordination of national research programs on terrorism related crisis 
management. Seventh FP funded some of the earlier projects, as development of sensors for explosives and 
crisis management support programs, but also funded many new research projects related to the expanded 
CT Action Plan in 2005, such as: security and decontamination of drinking water systems, underwater 
coastal sea surveyor, integrated security of rail transport, and several projects in fighting against radical 
extremism and terrorism recruitment. European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism 
Measures, 63-65. 




CT-related annual grants boosted; from €6.59 million in 2005 to €54.10 million in 
2010.448 
D. CONTRIBUTION TO CT BY LARGE IT-SYSTEMS  
The estimated cost of large IT-systems related to CT since 2001 is €22.66 million 
and represents 6.5 percent of total CT-related costs. This cost increased from negligible 
€0.05 million in 2002 to its maximum of €6.9 million in 2009, and consists of 
expenditures regarding to two the largest European IT-systems; the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS).   
The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted on 25 March 2004, in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid, represented a turning point 
with regard to the use of migration controls in EU counter-terrorism. For 
the first time, migration control measures were clearly identified as a 
priority in the development of the EU counter-terrorism policy.449 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SIS 0.05  0.08  0.37  0.32  1.00  0.80  1.61  2.30  1.95  
VIS - - 1.00  0.33  3.80  4.00  2.40  4.60  2.00  
Total large 
IT-systems 0.05 0.08 1.37 0.65 4.80 4.80 4.01 6.90 3.95 
Table 10.   Estimated costs of contribution to CT by large IT-systems in € millions 
(From:450) 
                                                 
 
448  The most important CT-related  grants in recent years have been in areas such as: protection 
of citizens and critical infrastructures against terrorist attacks (CIPS); prevention and fight against crime 
(ISEC); optimization of methods of photo identification, CT explosives control system, sharing of best 
practice amongst European CT professionals, support victims of terrorist acts, projects countering violent 
radicalization, and support community's CT activities to further improve the security of citizens. European 
Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 70-78. 
449 Sarah Leonard, “The Use and Effectiveness of Migration Controls as a Counterterrorism 
Instrument in the European Union,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol. 
4, No. 1 (2010): 34-35, http://usir.salford.ac.uk/18771/.  




Regarding to the SIS IT-system, the European Council in 2004 and 2005 decided 
to adapt it in order to meet the requirements of the fight against terrorism, and following 
that the CT-related budget increased for almost five times from €0.08 million in 2003 to 
€0.37 million in 2004, and later reached maximum in 2009 as of €2.3 million (Table 
10).451 Relatively small CT expenditures are because the SIS has limited contribution to 
CT and researches in the study of European CT-related costs assessed that contribution as 
only 10 percent.452 Although, the VIS function in fight against terrorism is its secondary 
tasks, assessed CT-related budget percentage is 20 percent and according to that CT-
related VIS costs since establishment in 2004 occupy €18.13 million of total cost of VIS 
IT-system of €90.65 million.453 After the European Council in 2005 supported broader 
use of VIS in CT, related spending increased in next year for more than ten times, and 
since then has remained high in compare with CT-costs of SIS database.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The report on Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures presents initial 
and preliminary findings, but even these rough estimations give a picture of the general 
trends in European CT-related expenditures. European CT-related costs funded from the 
EU budget are estimated on modest €348.84 million, yet since 9/11 CT expenditures have 
risen constantly to almost 1 percent of the EU budget in recent years and correlates with 
trends in introduction of new CT measures and terrorist activities. Thus, the impact of the 
CT-related costs on the total EU budget is very low, but the overall results of CT since 
                                                 
 
451 The main adaptations of SIS made by the Council Regulation (EC) No 871/2004 of April 29, 
2004, and the Council Decision 2005/211/JHA of February 24, 2005, “concerned access of Europol, 
national members of Eurojust and national judicial authorities to the data contained in SIS.”; European 
Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 80.   
452 Total SIS expenditure in period 2002-2010 is €84.8 million; European Parliament, Estimated 
Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, 81. 
453 The VIS IT-system is the European central database that contains non-EU country visa 
applicants’ personal data, and it is introduced in 2004 with the aim of improving internal security and 
combating terrorism in combination with other EU border security measures, including SIS, FRONTEX, 
and PNR. “The information contained in the database includes personal data, fingerprints and a photograph 
of the applicant, as well as previous applications.”; Regarding the European CT-related measures, VIS 
database has been used the most by the Europol who accesses its contents, for “preventing, detecting and 




9/11 are very positive and even the majority of European stakeholders454 recently 
supported CT as the greatest added value of all EU internal policies, especially in relation 
with its low level of expenditures.455  
Funding of indirect and low-visibility measures, especially research projects 
through the EU’s Framework Programs and annual grants, represent more than two thirds 
of the overall European CT costs. Other components of the total CT costs like funding 
CT policy programs, CT-related agencies, or major IT-systems have not used large 
amounts of EU budget, but they were more visible. Such EU agencies as Europol and 
Eurojust were executors in most of the operational cross-borders CT activities from the 
EU side, and this analysis finds that a significant CT contribution may be achieved even 
with humble budgets.  
The first report Estimated Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures finally brings 
some new insights in European CT financial issue and provoked new CT expenditures 
related initiatives. First, the European Parliament recently requested from the 
Commission to provide in future regular and more accurate reports on CT costs. Second, 
the Commission proposed restructuring of EU internal security funds that includes more 
controlled CT-related funds and gradually increasing of CT part of EU budget in 
detrimental to other EU policies. Ultimately, European citizens, EU officials, 
stakeholders, and even international CT partners agree that European CT efforts have 
many positive effects; however this broad guessing at CT costs should be accepted as an 
                                                 
 
454 EU institutions, governments, social partners, civil society and academia. 
455 [EU] DG Home has recently held a public consultation (from 5 January to 20 March 2011) via 
an online questionnaire, open to all stakeholders interested. One of the questions aimed at identifying where 
stakeholders deem the EU to add the greatest value and where to channel funding to deliver on DG Home 
key policies… Respondents ranked prevention of and fight against terrorism and organized crime (52 
percent) as highest, followed by law enforcement (43 percent), legal migration and integration of third-
country nationals (47 percent), building a Common European Asylum System (48 percent), and integrated 
border management (42 percent) as the most important. When asked whether EU funding could be used to 
promote practical cooperation between Member States in each policy area, the strongest case existed in 
prevention of and fight against terrorism and organized crime. European Parliament, Estimated Costs of EU 




additional argument that the EU’s significant CT achievements in the last decade are 















Although many European states had their own experiences with domestic and 
international terrorism over the years, the first joint European CT legal-institutional 
measures were developed after establishment of the European Union in 1992. Even then, 
the EU’s initial priority was developing the essential legal documents for EU institutions; 
development of the European CT legal framework in that time was slow, with only a few 
essential conventions, plans for plans, and agreements to agree taking shape in nearly 10 
years. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States shifted the EU’s 
priorities to the development of a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for 
counterterrorism that so far has introduced and implemented more than 100 CT legal and 
institutional measures. These measures cover a wide range of CT activities and 
arrangements, and some include counterterrorism as only one of several points of focus, 
but all were developed under a comprehensive approach to cover all pillars of CT—
protection, prevention, response, pursuit—and to comply with the EU’s promise to 
combat terrorism while respecting human rights.  
A chronological review of the European CT response shows a clear pattern to the 
development of CT legal-institutional measures—not surprisingly related to major 
terrorist incidents: the post-9/11 initial stage, the post-Madrid attack stage, and the post-
London attack stage. These tragic events further mobilized the EU for the faster and 
broader introduction and implementation of CT legal-institutional measures, institutions, 
and actions. In the absence of a globally accepted definition of terrorism, consensus on 
the European definition of terrorism within the Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism, adopted in 2002, was a great achievement, which has served as the legal 
cornerstone of all subsequent European CT efforts. On the other hand, the lack of a 
common strategic CT approach and the absence of major terrorist attacks in Europe right 
after the Framework Decision led to a shift in the EU’s priorities and to serious delays in 
the implementation of CT measures, at least until the Madrid and London attacks 




2001 had not adopted any definition of terrorism, let alone a common or even reliably 
cooperative CT approach, the fact that just few years later, they implemented a broad set 
of legal and institutional CT measures represents a major success.   
As this thesis has shown, the European CT initiatives played a great role in this 
achievement. Specifically, review of key CT-related institutions—Europol, Eurojust, 
European CTC, and the SitCen—shows that they added value from the EU level to the 
member states in terrorism response, especially with CT lessons learned and data sharing, 
threat analyses, and cross-border investigations, arrests and prosecution cooperation.   
Now that it is up and running, is this CT framework worth something or is it just 
another useless set of administrative measures without any operational effect? After the 
qualitative analysis of the European Arrest Warrant, Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Directives, EU targeted sanctions against individuals or groups, and CT-related 
bilateral agreements with the United States, is the present research makes clear that the 
European CT solutions, as practiced, are balanced and provide sufficient human rights 
protections while not diminishing its CT effectiveness. Outcomes in this analysis, 
especially EU solutions to the security-versus-human-rights dilemma and implementation 
challenges, are even more valuable as an evidence of European CT quality because 
researched measures have been used the most as negative examples of European CT 
initiatives.  
The European Arrest Warrant is an innovative and efficient mechanism for 
accelerated extradition, with quick apolitical decision-making rules. Importantly, it also 
has options to deny extradition in case of possible derogation of human rights in issuing 
state. The Money Laundering Directives, after a delayed implementation because national 
and European bar and law associations’ concerns, are now in effect and provide a useful 
CT tool for member states. Furthermore, following the lessons learned in the third MLD 
implementation, the European Commission became proactive and recently started 
consultations with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe in order to better 
clarify some of the CT-lawyer-related issues in the anticipated fourth MLD. In the case of 




or groups (1267 and 1373), the EU’s approach is an excellent example of human rights-
sensitive implementation, even if this approach leads to momentary conflict with other 
strategic partners, including the UN Security Council. The EU’s unilateral 
implementation of exceptions to freezing funds for basic expenses, though heavily 
criticized by the Security Council, eventually replaced the harder line that the UN and 
others originally took in their resolutions.  
Even in the hardest case of international CT cooperation—with the United States, 
where two different legal systems collide—the European Union ensured that the CT-
related agreements accorded with the European Convention of Human Rights. Although 
there are still some unclear CT legal provisions, especially in the EAW and MLD, that 
can lead in violation of human rights during implementation, the EU is more eager now 
to police member states’ implementation acts, which ensures that future CT measures 
will be more fair and lawful. In all, the analysis confirms that the EU fulfilled its promise 
to protect European citizens and democratic common values against terrorism, while 
simultaneously respecting human rights.  
More broadly, a cumulative analysis of all selected indicators shows the positive 
effects of the European CT framework, especially in the years since the introduction of 
the European CT Strategy. The implementation of the majority of European CT measures 
in these years corresponds to a decreasing trend in terrorist attacks—since 2007, such 
incidents have dropped off by more than 70 percent. In the number of terrorism-related 
fatalities and injuries has decreased significantly for first time after 2008, and the number 
of victims per terrorism attack for recent years is more than seven times lower than in the 
rest of the world—which was quite different over the several decades before 2001. Such 
straightforward numbers provide some of the quantitative evidence of the effects and 
effectiveness of the European CT framework. Moreover, in the absence of a theory that 
describes how look for a positive CT effect in relation to trends of arrests and convictions 
of terrorists, this thesis provides a new one. It suggests that after the implementation of 
new CT measures and increased CT activities, the number of arrested and later 




continues to work in synergy, these numbers should decrease. The EU’s experience 
follows exactly this pattern, which further affirms the success of its CT measures so far.   
Furthermore, all of these positive results from direct indicators such as terrorist 
activities, victims, arrests, prosecutions and convictions, as well as absence of terrorist 
attacks with mass casualties, also ramify in public perceptions of terrorism as a threat in 
Europe. More than decade after September 11, and seven years after the last major 
terrorist attack in the EU, Europeans do not much fear terrorism and its importance in the 
eyes of Europeans has dropped in recent years to an almost vanishing 2 percent–and this 
trend applies to all EU member states, even France, Spain, and the UK, where more 
prevalent domestic terrorism once made these polities significantly more apprehensive of 
the issue. Analysis of EU citizens’ fear of terrorism shows that the diminishing fear level 
correlates with the rate of implementation of CT measure, as well as with the decline in 
failed, foiled, and successful terrorist attacks in EU. At the same time, a large majority of 
EU citizens support these CT efforts as positive, and they support the European CT 
approach as superior to U.S. measures, not least because of the civil-liberties protections 
involved.   
Of course, one can hardly list the benefits of these measures without a word about 
the costs. The overview in this thesis, based on the first official EU report of Estimated 
Costs of EU Counterterrorism Measures, presents some initial estimation of the real costs 
of CT in Europe; even these rough numbers suggest that overall, the European CT-related 
expenditure is very modest, especially compared to the outlays of Europe’s main strategic 
CT partner, the United States. European CT-related costs have risen steadily since 2001, 
to a total expenditure of €348.84 million, but the annual proportion represents but 1 
percent of the whole EU budget in recent years, very humble in comparison with other 
EU policy areas. This analysis finds that a significant CT contribution may be achieved 
even with modest budgets. Furthermore, even the majority of European stakeholders 
recently supported the European CT legal-institutional framework as the greatest added 
value of all EU internal policies, which is very positive in relation with the low level of 




impossible in no small part because of the uncountable costs of human life, the findings 
in this thesis—that the European CT framework has many positive effects at very modest 
costs—should be accepted as a strong evidence that the European fight against terrorism 
since 9/11 has been cost-effective.    
Additionally, some findings on recent CT initiatives may further encourage the 
effectiveness of the European CT legal-institutional framework in the near future. The 
European Commission recently started to work on a more efficient overview of CT 
measures and their achievements, the first concerted effort to corral the 100-plus CT 
measures that are currently scattered around various EU policy areas. The recently 
published EU working documents on the main achievements and future challenges of 
European CT; the report on estimated CT expenditures; and the EU Parliament initiative 
for regular and more accurate provision of CT-related information are a good start on a 
useful inventory of CT measures. It will definitely makes less challenging all future CT-
related analysis for EU institutions, CT practitioners, and scholars. Furthermore, the more 
proactive role of the current CTC, his regular reports with straightforward 
recommendations, the new initiative of the wider authorities of CTC, and the important 
initiative for a more unified CT framework under the Lisbon Treaty all look very 
promising.  
Next, although the majority of the EU Action Plan for Combating Radicalization 
and Recruitment to Terrorism is classified, several other EU reports show that the EU 
recently funded several pilot programs related to the prevention of radicalization, 
fortifying the “prevent” pillar, which had been rather underdeveloped in compare with 
the other CT strategy pillars. Also, the Lisbon Treaty provision that authorizes the 
creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and an initiative to give Europol some 
authority in interstate investigations will aid CT-related cross-border arrests and 
prosecutions. Finally, the Commission recently proposed the restructuring of EU internal 
security funds that promote stronger control and gradually increase of the CT-related 
parts of the EU budget. All of these current initiatives ensure further development and 




After the comprehensive research into the development and outcomes of the post-
9/11 European CT legal-institutional framework through quantitative, qualitative, and 
effectiveness analyses, as well as in light of the overview of overall CT costs, the final 
conclusion of this thesis is that European Union has developed successfully a 
comprehensive CT framework with many positive effects while assuring a high level of 
human rights to all involved, including even the terrorists. This significant contribution to 
European and global CT efforts must be regarded as a major achievement, even 
accounting for the work that must yet be done. Thus, this thesis, on the one hand, 
acknowledges all these positive outcomes of the European CT efforts, and on the other 
hand, emphatically urges a continued commitment to the fight against terrorism and the 
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